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If a taxpayer sells property for more than the property cost him,
the gain realized on the sale is subject to income tax.' If a taxpayer
makes a gift of appreciated property, the donee takes the property with
the donor's basis, so the appreciation will be taxed when the donee sells
the property.2 But if a taxpayer dies owning appreciated property, the
appreciation is not taxed at death, and the basis of the property be-
comes its fair market value at death.' The result is that the apprecia-
tion is never subject to income tax. This permanent forgiveness of
income tax on appreciation transferred at death has been called "the
most serious defect in our federal tax structure" by two leading ex-
perts. It is certainly one of the most expensive gaps in the tax base.
The President's Budget estimates the annual revenue loss from the fail-
ure to tax gains at death at more than $25 billion.5 Current law is objec-
tionable also for its lock-in effect: elderly taxpayers are discouraged
from disposing of appreciated assets, because if they hold the assets
until death, the appreciation will escape income taxation permanently.,
This tax forgiveness did not originate as a conscious policy deci-
sion.7 Rather it occurred almost accidentally from the combination of
two ideas that were accepted instinctively during the early years of the
income tax: that the mere transfer of property at death did not consti-
1. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a) (1992). Unless otherwise noted, all references in this Article are
to the current I.R.C.
2. I.R.C. Section 1015.
3. I.R.C. § 1014 provides for the increase in basis. No provision of the I.R.C. explicitly states
that appreciation is not taxed at death, but the IRS has never claimed that death constitutes a
realization event under Section 1001 or otherwise.
4. Stanley Surrey and Jerome Kurtz, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 Treasury
Proposals, The Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1381 (1970).
5. The Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1993 estimates the revenue
loss at $24.365 billion in 1991, $26.8 billion in 1992, and $28.4 billion in 1993. Office of the Presi-
dent, Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1993, Special Analysis G 2-26 (U.S.
Gov. Printing Off., 1992). For a discussion of revenue loss estimates, see text accompanying notes
44-49.
6. The lock-in effect discourages gifts as well as sales. A lifetime gift does not trigger tax on
the appreciation, but it prevents a step-up in basis upon the donor's death. I.R.C. § 1015.
7. Until 1921, no tax statute specified the basis of property received by gift or bequest. The
administrative practice was to give such property a basis equal to its value at the date of transfer.
Anita Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains Under the Federal Income Tax,
1913-1948, 2 Nat'l Tax J. 12, 16 (1949). In 1921, Congress enacted the predecessors of present
I.R.C. §§ 1014 and 1015 (setting a fair market value basis for bequests and a carryover basis for
gifts). One commentator has noted that the rationale for the Section 1014-type statute is unclear,
and that it appears "to have been merely the legislative adoption of a consistent administrative
practice." Louis M. Castruccio, Becoming More Inevitable? Death and Taxes ... and Taxes, 17
UCLA L. Rev. 459, 460-61 (1970).
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tute a realization of gain or loss on the property, 8 and that fair market
value basis for heirs was appropriate to prevent taxation of capital, be-
cause "'capital' was thought to refer to some tangible thing, whatever
its value, rather than to a monetary account keeping track of what has
been taxed."9
Defenders of the current system have justified it on the grounds
that the step up in basis is "paid for" by the estate tax on the apprecia-
tion.10 It is true that appreciation that escapes income tax may not es-
cape estate tax, and the estate tax rate may even be higher than the
income tax rate." Nevertheless, there are two problems with this argu-
ment. First, the step up in basis applies even to property that is not
subject to estate tax (because of the unified credit 2 or the marital be-
quest deduction'"). Second, and more important, the income and estate
taxes are distinct, both conceptually and practically. Conceptually,
there is no reason why appreciation transferred at death should not be
subject to both taxes-to the income tax because it is gain, and to the
estate tax because it is a gratuitous transfer. Practically, gratuitously
transferred income is generally subject to both taxes. If a taxpayer sells
appreciated property during life, the gain is subject to income tax, and
if at death he transfers the proceeds of the sale (reduced by the income
tax paid) to his beneficiaries, the estate tax will apply as well. The
treatment of appreciation at death thus produces inequity between tax-
payers who realize income during life, and those who transfer unreal-
ized appreciation at death. The inequity is both horizontal
(discriminating between different taxpayers of similar income and
wealth) and vertical (favoring wealthy taxpayers because a greater por-
tion of their income tends to be in the form of unrealized appreciation
transferred at death).' 4
If Congress desires to eliminate the permanent forgiveness of capi-
tal gains tax at death, it could do so either by providing that the basis
of property transferred at death carries over to heirs and beneficiaries,
or by taxing gains at death. During the process that led to the enact-
8. The leading early case on realization, Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), indicated
that gain was realized only when it somehow was severed from capital. Death, of course, does not
produce any such severance.
9. Calvin Johnson, The Undertaxation of Holding Gains, 55 Tax Notes 807, 813 (1992).
10. Boris Bittker and Lawrence Lokken, 2 Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts
41-32 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 2d ed. 1989) (stating, but criticizing, the argument).
11. Under current law, the highest rate on capital gain is 28%, I.R.C. § 1(h), and the lowest
estate tax rate (after application of the unified credit) is 37%, id. § 2001(c)(1).
12. Applied against the rate schedule of I.R.C. Section 2001(c), the unified credit of Section
2010 exempts $600,000 from estate taxation.
13. I.R.C. § 2056.
14. Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options, Part
2 at 370 (U.S. G.P.O. 1990) ("Reducing the Deficit").
[Vol. 46:361
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ment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, virtually every base-broadening
reform with significant support among tax policy experts was discussed
by Congress and the administration. 15 The one glaring exception was
the forgiveness of gains tax at death. "' This omission would be astound-
ing, ' 7 but for some history.
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress enacted Section
1023 of the Internal Revenue Code, which generally provided a carry-
over basis (rather than a Section 1014 fair market value at death basis)
for inherited property.' Congress added the carryover basis provision
to the Act very late in the legislative process, with little opportunity for
either input from interest groups or careful technical drafting.19 Af-
fected taxpayers and their representatives harshly criticized it, on both
technical and policy grounds, 0 and in 1980 it was repealed retroac-
tively.2 1 Regardless of one's views on the merits of carryover basis, its
short unhappy life was one of the greatest legislative fiascoes in the his-
tory of the income tax. This was recent history in 1986, and it is under-
standable that Congress lacked the fortitude to revisit the issue so soon.
In the past few years, interest in this area slowly has reawakened.22
As memory of Section 1023 recedes, as pressure to raise revenue with-
15. The two major administration documents are Office of the President, The President's
Tax Proposals to Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity (U.S. G.P.O. 1985); and Dept. of
the Treasury, 1 Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and Economic Growth (Dept. of the Trea-
sury, 1984) ("The President's Tax Proposals to Congress"). The Committee Reports are: Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Tax Reform Act of 1986 Conference
Report, H.R. Rep. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); and Tax Reform Act of 1985, H.R. Rep. No.
426, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985).
16. The only mention was a sort of nonmention. The Treasury Department included "capital
gains on appreciated assets transferred at death or by gift" in a list of "items not included in the
tax reform proposal." The President's Tax Proposals to Congress at 147.
17. It is especially surprising because the 1986 Act repealed the so-called General Utilities
doctrine, which allowed liquidating corporations permanently to avoid corporate level tax on the
distribution (or, in some cases, even the sale) of their appreciated assets. Tax Reform Act of 1986,
§ 631, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2058 (1986). The General Utilities doctrine is the corporate
analog of the forgiveness of gains at death, so it is strange that tax reform would repeal one and
not even consider the other.
18. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 2005, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1874, repealed by
Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, § 401(a), Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229, 299 (1980).
19. Howard Hoffman, The Role of the Bar in the Tax Legislative Process, 37 Tax L. Rev.
411, 441 (1982).
20. The criticisms are described by Hoffman. Id. at 448-68. The American Bankers Associa-
tion and the American Bar Association were especially vocal in their opposition.
21. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act § 401(a), 94 Stat. at 229.
22. Recent indications of interest include the following: Reducing the Deficit at 315-17 (cited
in note 14) (discussing the revenue effect of taxing gains at death); Charles 0. Galvin, To Bury the
Estate Tax, Not to Praise It, 52 Tax Notes 1413 (1991) (proposing repeal of the estate tax and its
replacement with recognition of gains at death); J. Andrew Hoerner, Panel Considers Capital
Gains, Indexing, and Weeding Complexity, 56 Tax Notes 839 (1992) (reporting a poll of members
of the A.B.A. Tax Section's Tax Structure and Simplification Committee, in which five of nine
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out raising rates increases, and as the remaining opportunities for sig-
nificant base-broadening reform diminish, it becomes more likely that
Congress eventually will revisit the area. And when Congress does, it
seems much more likely (for reasons discussed below)2" that it will tax
gains at death, rather than revive carryover basis. In a recent interview
with the Wail Street Journal, then President-elect Clinton remarked
that taxing gains at death "probably should be looked at," and that he
"wouldn't rule it out."' 24
The purpose of this Article is not to argue for the taxation of capi-
tal gains at death,25 but to provide a guide for legislators in considering
the many policy and technical issues that would arise in designing and
respondents favored taxation of capital gains at death, if basis is indexed for inflation); J. Andrew
Hoerner, Frank Proposes Tax Increases to Fund Major New Public Housing Initiative, 42 Tax
Notes 1149 (1989) (reporting a proposal by Rep. Barney Frank to tax capital gains at death).
23. See text accompanying notes 26-43.
24. Jeffrey Birnbaum and Michael Frisby, Democratic Agenda, Wall St. J. A-6 (Dec. 18,
1992) (excerpts from the interview with President-elect Clinton). Opposition has surfaced quickly
from lobbyists for small businesses and farmers. Rick Wartzman, Clinton Suggestion of Possible
Capital Gains Tax Upon Death Stirs Ire Among Powerful Interests, Wall St. J. A-16 (Jan. 5,
1993).
25. The question of whether there are any constitutional impediments to a capital gains tax
at death is beyond the scope of this Article. There would be an impediment if the doctrine of
Macomber-that the government can tax constitutionally only realized income-is still good law,
and if death does not satisfy the realization requirement. Although the Supreme Court has not
overruled Macomber, later cases suggest that the Supreme Court no longer takes realization seri-
ously as a constitutional requirement. See, for example, United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962)
(holding that a husband realized gain upon the transfer of appreciated stock to his wife in satisfac-
tion of her marital rights in connection with their divorce); Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461
(1940) (holding that the government could tax a lessor on the value of the lessee's improvements to
the premises, upon the forfeiture of the leasehold, despite the fact that the improvements were not
severed from the land). Professor Chirelstein has remarked that "at present most tax commenta-
tors would be likely to feel that the congressional taxing power is not seriously restricted by such
an implied [realization] requirement," and that "Congress could surely tax property appreciation
at gift or death if it desired to do so." Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation: A Law
Student's Guide to the Leading Cases and Concepts 68-69 (Foundation Press, 5th ed. 1988).
Several provisions in the current I.R.C. impose tax on income no more realized than apprecia-
tion at death. For example: Section 1256 requires the value of certain contracts to be "marked to
market" annually; Sections 551 to 558 tax United States shareholders on their proportionate
shares of the undistributed income of foreign personal holding companies; and Sections 957 to 964
tax United States shareholders on certain categories of undistributed income of controlled foreign
corporations. The foreign personal holding company rules were upheld against constitutional chal-
lenge in Eder v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1943). The controlled foreign corporation rules
have been upheld in Estate of Whitlock v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir. 1974); Garlock,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1973) (stating that the constitutional challenge
"borders on the frivolous"); Doughtery v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 917, 927-30 (1973), supplemented
61 T.C. 719 (1974).
A number of commentators have concluded that a tax on appreciation at death would be
constitutional. See, for example, President's 1963 Tax Message, Hearings Before the Comm. on
Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 596-602 (1963) ("President's 1963 Tax Message") (state-
ment of General Counsel of the Treasury); Castruccio, 17 UCLA L. Rev. at 492-97 (cited in note 7);
Phillip J. Hanrahan, A Proposal for Constructive Realization of Gains and Losses on Transfers of
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implementing a gains tax at death. Part II of this Article explains why a
death gains tax is a more attractive option than carryover basis and
considers what Congress might do with the revenue raised by a death
gains tax. Part III considers whether transition relief is required (either
theoretically or politically) and some forms transition relief might take.
Part IV then examines the problems of proving basis at death, which
played a major role in the arguments over carryover basis in the late
1970s. Finally, Part V discusses a number of structural issues in design-
ing a death gains tax, which require a balancing of simplicity, equity,
and revenue concerns. Those structural issues include the treatment of
marital and charitable bequests; the relation of the death gains tax to
the estate tax; the need for anti-avoidance rules; the design of an ex-
emption for small estates; problems presented by special types of assets
(including collectibles, homes, life insurance, and ordinary income as-
sets); the treatment of losses at death; and the need for liquidity relief
provisions.
II. THE BASIC POLICY OPTIONS
A. Choosing Between Carryover Basis and Taxing Gains at Death
Either carryover basis at death or a death gains tax would prevent
the permanent avoidance of gains tax that occurs under current law. At
the theoretical level, the argument for carryover basis is that postpon-
ing tax until an actual sale of the property avoids the need to appraise
the property 6 and imposes tax at a time when the taxpayer is likely to
have cash available to pay the tax. The arguments for gains tax at
death are that it appropriately limits the maximum deferral possibility
to a single lifetime; it enforces the principle that income should be
taxed to the person who earned it;27 it imposes tax at an ideal time in
terms of ability to pay (because the decedent has no use for the amount
due as taxes, and whatever the heirs or beneficiaries receive is a wind-
fall); and, unlike carryover basis, it solves the problem of lock-in.2" Con-
gress will not choose, however, between the two approaches based on
Property by Gift and at Death, 15 Kan. L. Rev. 133, 155-56 (1966); Philip Rubin, Taxing Appreci-
ated Property at Death: The Case for Reform, 51 Or. L. Rev. 364, 371-75 (1972).
26. If Congress imposes a death gains tax only on estates subject to the estate tax, the gains
tax will not involve any additional appraisal requirements. It does increase, however, the tax con-
sequences of an inaccurate appraisal.
27. Charles 0. Galvin, Burying the Estate Tax: Keeping Ghouls Out of the Cemetery: A
Reply to Professor Smith, 56 Tax Notes 951, 953 (1992).
28. Carryover basis does lessen the problem of pre-death lock-in because elderly taxpayers
know their assets will not receive a stepped-up basis at death. However, carryover basis creates a
new problem of post-death lock-in: because the heirs inherit with low carryover basis, they are
discouraged from selling the assets. Under either current law or a gains tax at death, the heirs take
assets with a fair market value basis, so post-death lock-in does not occur.
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such theoretical considerations. Rather, the key issues will be the com-
plexity of administering the two approaches and the relative amounts of
revenue they would raise.
The most serious administrative difficulty-proof of basis-would
loom equally large under either system. In other respects, however, a
death gains tax would be somewhat simpler to apply than carryover ba-
sis. Carryover basis would create a new problem for executors, because
their fiduciary duties would require them to make not only an equitable
distribution of value among beneficiaries, but also an equitable distri-
bution of basis. A death gains tax does not present this problem, be-
cause all assets (other than assets going to a surviving spouse, if the
system permits deferral of gains on such assets) receive a fair market
value basis following the imposition of the tax at death. In addition,
carryover basis requires the maintenance of basis records across unlim-
ited numbers of generations; a death gains tax does not.
A major complication of carryover basis is the death tax basis ad-
justment. In order to make the consequences of carryover basis consis-
tent with the tax consequences of selling appreciated property before
death, it is necessary to increase the basis of appreciated carryover ba-
sis property by the death taxes (federal and state estate taxes, and state
succession tax) attributable to the appreciation.2 9 Although the princi-
ple is easy enough to state, applying it can be very complex. Section
1023(c) calculated the adjustment for each asset by multiplying the ap-
preciation in the asset by the average tax rate for the entire estate.
Since the average tax rate for an estate is a function of the value of
every asset in the estate, the basis of every appreciated asset in the
estate was uncertain as long as the value of even one asset was
uncertain.3
29. Suppose, for example, a 50% flat rate estate tax and a 28% flat rate capital gains tax, and
a taxpayer with just two assets: $1,000,000 cash, and stock with a basis of zero and a value of
$1,000,000. If the taxpayer sold the stock before his death for $1,000,000, the gains tax would be
$280,000, and payment of the tax would reduce his estate to $1,720,000. The 50% estate tax would
be $860,000, and the beneficiaries would receive $860,000. In order to replicate this result if the
taxpayer dies and the stock is then sold by the estate or by the beneficiaries, a death tax basis
adjustment is needed. The estate tax liability is $1,000,000 (50% of $2,000,000), of which $500,000
is attributable to the appreciation in the stock. The $1,000,000 cash is used to pay the estate tax,
and the beneficiaries receive the stock. The beneficiaries thus take the stock with a basis of
$500,000, after the death tax basis adjustment. The gain on a subsequent sale of the stock for
$1,000,000 is $500,000, resulting in a tax of $140,000. Reducing the $1,000,000 proceeds by $140,000
leaves the beneficiaries with $860,000-the same amount they would have received if the decedent
had sold the stock before death.
30. Background and Issues Relating to Carryover Basis, Hearings Before Joint Comm. On
Taxation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (U.S. G.P.O. 1979) ("Background and Issues"). According to
Section 1023(c), the average tax rate was the total estate tax liability divided by the fair market
value of all property subject to tax. The change in the value of any asset would change both of
those numbers. Additional uncertainty was created by the rule, in Section 1023(0(4) that no death
[Vol. 46:361
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The leading clean-up proposal 1 would have simplified the death
tax adjustment by making it at the estate's marginal rate, rather than
the average rate.32 This proposal would have reduced uncertainty, be-
cause in many cases an audit adjustment of an asset's value would not
change the marginal rate.3 In the interests of simplicity, clean up also
would have allowed only a single adjustment based on the federal estate
tax, rather than multiple adjustments for both federal and state death
taxes.3 4 The clean-up proposal would have created a new uncertainty,
however, by providing that the total death tax adjustment could not
exceed the marginal estate tax rate multiplied by the lesser of (a) the
aggregate appreciation in the estate or (b) the taxable estate.3 5 Thus,
uncertainty in the amount of the taxable estate could leave the amount
of the death tax basis adjustment unknown indefinitely.36 Although the
clean-up method of adjustment would not have been unworkable,
37 it
would add a complication not involved in a death gains tax.
Another problem of carryover basis is the need for some
method-whether by mechanical rules or executor election-of allocat-
ing whatever minimum basis adjustment is allowed. Allocation of the
adjustment is necessary under carryover basis because gain on different
tax basis adjustment was allowed for property that was not subject to tax because of the marital or
charitable deduction: "Thus, tax consequences may be uncertain for sales by an executor, or for
distributions to a surviving spouse, during the estate's administration because at that time it may
not be certain as to how much property will not be subject to the estate tax under the marital or
charitable deduction." Background and Issues at 26-27.
31. Representative Fisher introduced the proposal with Treasury support.
32. H.R. Rep. No. 4694, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a), in 125 Cong. Rec. H5491 (daily ed., Sept.
28, 1979) ("H.R. 4694") (proposed § 1023(c)(5)). The marginal rate was defined as the highest
applicable rate, the amount subject to which is at least $50,000. Id. § 2(a) (proposed §
1023(c)(5)(E)).
33. In addition, H.R. 4694 would have eliminated the rule of Section 1023(f)(4), that the
adjustment was not available for marital deduction property. Id. § 2(a). This change simplified the
administration of the adjustment, but arguably at the cost of some inequity.
34. Congress based the federal estate tax basis adjustment on the estate tax marginal rate,
without a reduction to reflect the Section 2011 credit for state death taxes. This would result in
inappropriately low adjustments in cases in which the state death taxes exceed the maximum Sec-
tion 2011 credit. Carryover Basis Provisions, Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1979) ("Carryover Basis Provisions") (statement of American Bankers
Association).
35. H.R. 4694 § 2(a) (proposed § 1023(c)(5)(A)).
36. [T]he amount of the adjustment will not be "final" until (a) the federal estate tax is
finally determined and the executor knows that the appreciation in such property is more than the
decedent's taxable estate, or (b) the marginal federal estate tax rate is known and the executor
knows that appreciation in appreciated carryover basis property is less than the decedent's taxable
estate, in which case the basis of each such property will be increased by its appreciation times the
marginal federal estate tax rate.
Carryover Basis Provisions at 51.
37. Id. at 230-33 (statement of American Institute of Certified Public Accountants); Richard
B. Covey and Dan T. Hastings, Cleaning Up Carryover Basis, 31 Tax Law. 615, 641-52 (1978).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
assets may be recognized at different times and by different taxpayers.
By contrast, this is not an issue under a death gains tax because all gain
is taxed at the same time to the same taxpayer.
Some commentators have argued that a death gains tax with carry-
over basis for marital bequests would be just as complicated as general
carryover basis. s They are right that not having a marital exemption is
simpler than having one, but they are wrong in arguing that a marital
exemption involves all the difficulties of general carryover basis. A mar-
ital exemption would require keeping basis records, not over several
generations, but only until the death of the surviving spouse. More im-
portant, the carryover basis for marital exemption property would be
pure carryover basis, without any of the complicating adjustments.
There would be no death tax adjustment because the marital bequest
would not have been subject to estate tax. No minimum basis adjust-
ment would be allowed for property passing to a surviving spouse, and
no transition rule basis adjustment would be made to such property at
that time; there would be no need to make either adjustment until the
property is actually subject to tax at the death of the surviving spouse.
More important than the modest simplicity advantage of tax at
death over carryover basis is the much greater revenue effect of tax at
death. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), for example, estimated
that taxing capital gains at death would raise $17.0 billion over four
years (1994 to 1997), while carryover basis would raise only $5.2 bil-
lion. 9 Part of the reason that Congress was unable to withstand the
pressure to repeal carryover basis was that carryover basis did not raise
very much revenue.4 ° It is difficult to resist impassioned (and plausible)
claims that the statute is too complex when the major argument in
favor of the statute is that it closes a loophole offensive to some aca-
demics. It should be considerably easier to resist the claims that the
statute is too complex when a major argument in favor of the law is
that it raises very substantial and badly needed revenue. 1
38. See, for example, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, Public Hearings and Panel Discussions
Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1211, 1218 (1976) ("Federal Estate
and Gift Taxes") (statement of Richard Covey).
39. Reducing the Deficit at 315 (cited in note 14). How much revenue is raised by either a
death gains tax or carryover basis will depend, of course, on the extent of relief given to smaller
estates. At any given level of relief, however, a death gains tax will raise substantially more reve-
nue than carryover basis.
40. In the long run, carryover basis (as enacted in 1976) was expected to raise $1.08 billion
annually. General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess.
597 (1976) ("Tax Reform Act of 1976"). Under the leading clean-up proposal, the revenue gain
would have been even less. Jt. Comm. on Taxation, Description of H.R. 13 and H.R. 4694 Relating
to Carryover Basis, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (U.S. G.P.O. 1979).
41. This is true whether the revenue is used for deficit reduction or reduction of capital gains
or estate tax rates.
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Although the revenue impact is by far the biggest advantage of the
gains tax, it has two additional political advantages over carryover ba-
sis. First, it does not carry the historical baggage of carryover basis. The
enactment and repeal of carryover basis was such a long and complete
fiasco42 that carryover basis may never be given serious consideration
again as long as anyone in Congress remembers that history. Legislators
must feel strongly that it has been fully considered and conclusively
rejected. Although that history also must color any consideration of a
death gains tax, it should not have so conclusive an effect. Second,
there are those (primarily academicians, but also some politicians and
practitioners) who strongly believe in taxing gains at death. By con-
trast, almost no one considers carryover basis the best way of dealing
with gains at death.43
B. Taxing Gains at Death: Revenue Implications and Policy
Choices
How much revenue would be raised by taxing capital gains at death
is unclear, but it is clear that it would be significant. The Budget of the
United States for Fiscal Year 1993 lists the failure to tax gain at death
as the fourth largest item in the tax expenditure budget, with estimated
revenue loss of more than $24 billion in 1991, more than $26 billion in
1992, and more than $28 billion in 1993.44 By contrast, the CBO has
estimated the annual revenue gain from taxing capital gains at death at
42. For a thorough (and depressing) account of the history of carryover basis, see generally
Hoffman, 37 Tax L. Rev. 411 (cited in note 19).
43. Id. at 442 (describing carryover as "the classic compromise that pleased no one"). He
remarks that during consideration of repeal of carryover, many who favored taxing gains at death
gave carryover little support. Id. at 442-43 n.121. During hearings held early in 1976 before the
enactment of carryover basis, a panel of experts resoundingly rejected carryover basis. Federal
Estate and Gift Taxes at 1435 (cited in note 38) (A. James Casner, stating that "the worst thing to
do is ... a carryover basis"); id. at 1444 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr., calling carryover "the worst of
the possible alternatives"; Rep. Ullman, summarizing the testimony: "The carryover basis is obvi-
ously very difficult. No one seems to favor it very much.").
44. Office of the President, Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1993
(cited in note 5). The exact figures are $24.365 billion, $26.8 billion, and $28.14 billion. Id. at 2-26.
The larger items in the tax expenditure budget are the expenditures for retirement savings, medi-
cal insurance, and home mortgage interest. The exemption of capital gains at death is unlike the
three larger items in that it is unclear what Congress intended the exemption to accomplish.
Whatever one may think of the other three expenditures, it is easy to understand why Congress
might choose to subsidize retirement savings, medical insurance, and homeownership. It is much
more difficult to understand the purpose of subsidizing the holding of appreciated property until
death.
Jt. Comm. on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax 1993-1997 Expenditures for Fiscal Years
1993-1997, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 14.0 (U.S. G.P.O. 1992), estimates the revenue loss from not
taxing capital gains at death to be much lower (although still very large): $11.6 billion in 1993,
$12.7 billion in 1994, $14.0 billion in 1995, $15.4 billion in 1996, and $17.1 billion in 1997. Neither
the Committee's report nor the Budget explains the discrepancy between the estimates.
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$5.3 billion by 1997.45 Much or all of the difference in the estimates
derives from the fact that the CBO estimate, unlike the budget esti-
mate, is for a tax with substantial exemptions. The CBO estimate is for
a tax with marital and charitable exemptions, with the option of using
one-half an asset's date-of-death value as basis, with the availability of
the $125,000 exclusion for gain on a primary residence (if not used dur-
ing life), and with a $75,000 exclusion for any remaining gains.46 The
revenue from taxing gains at death would be substantial even by federal
budget standards, but standing alone it would put only a small dent in
the deficit. The size of that dent would be decreased, of course, by
whatever exemptions from the tax Congress provides, whether based on
particular types of assets, destination of assets, or size of the estate.
47
There are general points worth noting about the revenue effect of
taxing gains at death. First, much of the revenue effect would be indi-
rect. That is, without the lock-in effect of forgiveness of gains tax at
death, elderly taxpayers would realize much more gain while still alive.
Thus, much (perhaps most) of the revenue gain from the death tax
would not result from assessing the tax at death, but from tax on dispo-
sitions during life which would not have occurred in the absence of a
death gains tax.48 Second, since the income tax liability created by the
tax on gains at death logically should be deductible under the estate tax
as a claim against the estate,49 a complete analysis of the revenue im-
pact of the gains tax must consider the partially offsetting reduction in
estate tax receipts. Consider, for example, $100 of appreciation held at
death, with an applicable capital gains tax rate of twenty-eight percent
and an applicable estate tax rate of fifty percent. Compared with no
capital gains tax, the gains tax increases income tax revenue by $28, but
decreases estate tax revenue by $14 (because the fifty percent estate tax
is imposed on $72 instead of $100), for a net revenue gain of $14.
45. Reducing the Deficit at 315 (cited in note 14). This compares with an estimate of $2.0
billion to be gained from adopting carryover basis at death. A similar estimate is made in Alan J.
Auerbach, Capital Gains Taxation and Tax Reform, 42 Nat'l Tax J. 391, 399 (1989).
46. Reducing the Deficit at 315-16. The Report also considered "levying an additional 10%
estate tax on gains held at death." It estimated this would raise only $0.6 billion in 1997. It ex-
plained the low estimate by the fact that the tax "could be offset by any unused credits allowed
under the estate tax." Id. at 316.
47. Exemptions are discussed in text accompanying notes 150-83 (destination of assets), 223-
53 (size of estate), and 243-95 (types of assets).
48. The President's 1963 proposal to tax capital gains at death estimated that annually the
tax would raise $300 million directly and $450 million as "revenue effect due to increased turnover
resulting from unlocking of asset holdings." President's 1963 Tax Message at 708 (cited in note
25).
49. I.R.C. Section 2053(a)(3) of the estate tax provides for a deduction for claims against an




Whatever the amount of revenue raised by the tax, there are three
major options for what to do with that revenue: use it to reduce the
deficit, use it to offset revenue lost from a decrease in the capital gains
tax rate, or use it to reduce or even eliminate the estate tax. Congress
also could devote the revenue to various combinations of the three uses.
The deficit reduction option is attractive. As a principled and per-
haps politically feasible way of raising substantial additional revenue
from the income tax without raising rates, it is a rarity. A death gains
tax would result in a top combined income and estate tax burden of
sixty-four percent on appreciation held at death, assuming a top capital
gains rate of twenty-eight percent and a top estate tax rate of fifty per-
cent.50 From an historical perspective, that is not a particularly high
federal death tax rate-as recently as 1981, the top estate tax rate was
seventy percent. 1 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the current
Congress would accept the sixty-four percent combined tax burden that
would result if the gains tax were used entirely for deficit reduction.
One economist has estimated that a reduction in the capital gains
tax rate to 12.5% and the taxation of gains at death would yield ap-
proximately the same revenue as the current twenty-eight percent capi-
tal gains rate and forgiveness of tax at death.5 2 This proposal is
attractive in several ways. Both parts of the proposal would reduce
lock-in: the lower rate would decrease resistance to recognizing gains
during life, and the death tax would eliminate the incentive to hold as-
sets until death. The proposal also would eliminate the horizontal ineq-
uity between taxpayers who sell appreciated assets during life and those
who hold assets until death, by moving both groups of taxpayers to the
same middle ground. It might fare well as a political compromise be-
tween those who feel strongly that there should be a significant reduc-
tion in capital gains rates and those offended by the forgiveness of
capital gains tax at death. A closely related possibility would use the
revenue raised by a death gains tax to pay for indexing of basis for
inflation.
50. A top estate tax rate of 50% assumes Congress will allow the elimination of the 53% and
55% brackets to occur in 1993 as scheduled, I.R.C. § 2001(c)(2)(D), and ignores the five percent
surtax caused by the phaseout of the graduated rates and the unified credit, I.R.C. § 2001(c)(3). A
28% tax on $100 of capital gains held at death leaves $72 subject to a 50% estate tax, which in
turn leaves the estate with $36. The combined tax burden is thus 64%.
51. Jt. Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. 229 (U.S. G.P.O. 1981).
52. Donald W. Kiefer, Lock-In Effect Within a Simple Model of Corporate Stock Trading,
43 Nat'l Tax J. 75, 90 (1990). Strangely enough, Nicole Hollander proposed precisely the same
capital gains tax rate in the following dialogue from her comic strip "Sylvia": "Why do you think
George Bush has this obsession with capital gains?" "Probably some childhood thing." "You know
I think it's the only thing he's ever really wanted? I say, let him have it. Let him bring the tax on
capital gains down to 15.4%." "What the heck, let's go all the way. Give him 12.5%." Coincidence?
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The estate and gift taxes raised approximately $12.1 billion in
1992.11 At least one commentator has suggested replacing the transfer
taxes with a capital gains tax imposed on gifts and bequests of appreci-
ated property.54 As the above discussion indicates, it is unclear whether
the revenue lost by repealing the transfer taxes could be replaced en-
tirely by taxing capital gains at death. Assuming, however, that the
change could be made revenue neutral, would it be a good idea? The
change might appeal to an "academic desire for tidiness,"55 because it
rationalizes the income tax by eliminating perhaps its most glaring
loophole. 56 In addition, it repeals a transfer tax system always objhc-
tionable for the many omissions from its base.5
Notice, however, that the potential tax base for a capital gains tax
on gratuitous transfers is substantially smaller than the potential tax
base for a transfer tax system-smaller by the amount of the cost bases
of the assets gratuitously transferred. Moreover, at current rates the
capital gains tax (twenty-eight percent top rate) will raise less revenue
from a given dollar amount of tax base than will the transfer taxes
(rates ranging from thirty-seven to fifty percent).58 Thus, for the capital
gains tax to raise as much revenue as the transfer taxes, with a smaller
potential base and lower rates, it must include in its actual base a much
higher percentage of its potential base than do the transfer taxes. Al-
though some of this might be done through loophole closing, the vast
majority would have to be done by using much lower exemption
amounts than the $600,000 transfer tax exemption created by the uni-
fied credit." Thus, assuming revenue neutrality, replacement of the
transfer taxes with a capital gains tax on transfers would result in a
major shift of tax burden away from the wealthy and the upper middle
53. Office of the President, Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1993 at
2-3 (cited in note 5). Actual estate and gift tax receipts for 1991 were $11.1 billion. Id.
54. Professor Galvin suggests repealing the transfer taxes and replacing them with either a
capital gains tax imposed at the time of gifts and bequests, an accessions tax, or some combination
of the two. Galvin, 52 Tax Notes at 1413 (cited in note 22).
55. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290 (1960).
56. Surrey and Kurtz, 70 Colum. L. Rev. at 1381 (cited in note 4).
57. For discussion of this issue, see George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on
Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 161 (1977).
58. I.R.C. § 2001(c)(1). This disregards the "phantom rates" offset by the unified credit,
I.R.C. § 2010, the phase-in of the 50% maximum rate, I.R.C. § 2001(c)(2), and the phase out of the
graduated rates and unified credit, I.R.C. § 2001(c)(3).
59. Galvin has reported that "Treasury representatives advise[d] Galvin informally that gift-
time and deathtime recognition of gain, standing alone, would probably make up the lost revenue
[from repeal of the estate and gift taxes]." Galvin, 56 Tax Notes at 951 (cited in note 27). Galvin
proceeds, however, to propose "a $600,000 threshold below which gain or loss would not be recog-
nized and basis would be stepped up," id. at 953, without recognizing that so high an exemption
level makes impossible full replacement of the lost transfer tax revenue.
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class, and onto the middle middle class.6 0 I would oppose the regressiv-
ity inherent in a such a change, and it seems likely Congress would
agree."'
In addition to its regressivity, the change would result in increased
complexity. The need for valuation of gratuitous transfers would re-
main, and the need to determine the basis of all gratuitous transfers
would arise. More significantly, these burdens would be imposed on
many middle class transferors currently not subject to the transfer
taxes.
As an alternative, of course, Congress could retain the transfer tax
system, but use the revenue raised from the new capital gains tax to
reduce the transfer tax burden, either by raising the exemption amount
or by reducing rates. If Congress keyed the exemption to the new capi-
tal gains tax to the transfer tax exemption, 2 it would impose no new
tax burden (either in terms of tax liability or the compliance burden)
on the middle class. Moreover, the exemption would improve horizontal
equity among the affluent taxpayers above the exemption levels, be-
cause all of them now would be subject to tax on their capital gains.
III. OPTIONS FOR TRANSITION RELIEF
During both the enactment of carryover basis and the discussion of
possible revisions, there was general agreement that it was not appro-
priate to apply carryover basis to appreciation occurring before the ef-
fective date of the statute.6 In other words, there was agreement that
appreciated property acquired before the effective date, and owned by a
decedent dying after the effective date, should receive a basis equal to
the fair market value of the property as of the effective date, rather
than the decedent's cost.6 4 The only disagreement was over how to' im-
plement this policy. In the case of marketable securities, whose fair
market value as of the effective date could be determined reliably, Sec-
60. Despite the relatively small amount of revenue they raise, the transfer taxes supply a
large part of the progressivity of the federal tax system. Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate
Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 Yale L. J. 259, 269-73 (1983). This contribution largely would be lost if the
transfer taxes were replaced by a capital gains tax.
61. Robert B. Smith, Burying the Estate Tax Without Resurrecting Its Problems, 55 Tax
Notes 1799, 1803-04 (1992), argues that the base broadening that would be necessary to replace the
transfer taxes with capital gains taxes would not be feasible politically because of its impact on the
middle class.
62. See text accompanying notes 224-53 for a discussion of how Congress could do this.
63. Nowhere in the hearings on carryover basis or in the legislative history is the possibility
of adopting carryover basis without transition relief even considered.
64. This was also the approach taken in Canada in 1971, Income Tax Application Rule
(I.T.A.R.) 26(3) (1991), and in the United States in 1913, currently reflected in Section 1053 of the
Code. Both of those cases were different, however, in that under prior law in those cases capital
gain would not have been subject to tax even if realized during life.
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tion 1023(h)(1) implemented the policy in the pure form described
above. In the case of other property, the difficulty in determining effec-
tive date fair market value led to the use of other approaches, including
pro rata apportionment of appreciation between the time of acquisition
and the decedent's death (the primary approach of Section 1023, re-
flected in Section 1023(h)(2)) and determining basis by discounting
back from the date of death value to the effective date at a prescribed
rate of interest.
65
A. Arguments for Transition Relief
The same issue of transition relief for appreciation accrued before
the effective date of the new law arises under a tax on capital gains at
death. If Congress considers such transition relief appropriate, there are
a number of different ways to provide it, reflecting various compromises
between theoretical correctness and administrative practicality. Before
the evaluation of those alternatives, however, comes the question of
whether any transition relief is appropriate. There are both substantive
and procedural arguments in favor of transition relief. The substantive
argument is based on concerns of equity and reliance: that it is unfair
to tax appreciation which, under the law as it existed at the time the
appreciation occurred, would not be taxed if the owner held the prop-
erty until death. According to this argument, the owner reasonably re-
lied on the forgiveness of capital gains tax at death in acquiring and
retaining the appreciated property. To change the rules now, to tax pre-
effective date appreciation, would violate reliance by retroactively im-
posing a tax.
The procedural argument focuses on the availability of cost records
for property acquired before the effective date. A taxpayer may have
failed to keep adequate basis records of such property because he rea-
sonably anticipated holding the property until his death, at which time
the basis would be irrelevant. Without transition relief, his executor
would be unable to prove any basis (the decedent is, of course, unavail-
able to help reconstruct basis records), and the entire fair market value
at death would be taxed as gain. This would be unfair to the extent of
65. This is the approach of Section 1023 for personal and household effects, and the primary
approach of the leading clean up bill. I.R.C. § 1023(h)(3), added by the Revenue Act of 1978, §
702(c)(2), Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, 2926 (1978), repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401(a)
(1980), provided for an elective discount back formula for "tangible personal property." H.R. 4694
§ 2(a) (cited in note 32) (proposed § 1023(d)(2)(a)) would have made the discount back formula
the general rule (except for marketable securities).
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the decedent's actual-but unprovable-cost. Transition relief could
ameliorate the harshness of that result.6
B. Arguments Against Substantive Transition Relief
There are, however, serious objections to the substantive argu-
ments for transition relief. First, no taxpayer could know with certainty
that he actually would hold any particular asset until death. Even if he
did not anticipate selling the asset, changed circumstances might lead
to a sale. Thus, even under current law the appreciation in every asset
of every taxpayer potentially is subject to tax, if there is a lifetime dis-
position. This potential for tax under current law arguably means that
taxpayers had no legitimate reliance interest in tax-free appreciation,
and that taxing pre-effective date appreciation at death would not be
unfair. The counterargument is that, despite the theoretical potential
for tax on all appreciation under current law, as a practical matter it is
inevitable that as long as the law remains unchanged, large amounts of
appreciation-perhaps the majority of all appreciatione'-will escape
taxation. The claim that all appreciation is taxable under current law is,
therefore, somewhat out of touch with economic reality. Moreover,
many taxpayers had good reason to expect, regarding particular assets,
that they could hold those assets until death. And for every asset for
which transition relief becomes an issue, hindsight will have proven
that taxpayer's expectation correct. The potential for tax on all appreci-
ation under current law weakens, but does not destroy, the substantive
argument for transition relief.
There is, however, another argument against transition relief,
which does not depend on the possibility of taxation under existing law.
This argument begins by examining the claim that taxing pre-effective
date appreciation would be a retroactive, and therefore unfair, change
in the law. As a matter of semantics, it is debatable whether applying a
change in the law to income economically accrued before the change,
but realized after the change (sometimes referred to as a carryover
66. The pro rata apportionment method of Section 1023 required proof of the decedent's
basis in the property (in addition to proof of acquisition date), and so at first glance appears to
have been aimed only at the substantive argument for transition relief. On the other hand, assum-
ing the executor can prove or at least estimate the acquisition date, pro rata apportionment may
result in a substantial basis for an asset even starting from a cost basis of zero. Thus, pro rata
apportionment is somewhat responsive to the procedural argument for transition relief.
67. The literature concerning what percentage of gain escapes tax by reason of I.R.C. Section
1014 is reviewed in Johnson, 55 Tax Notes at 811-12 (cited in note 9). Johnson reports that "the
variation in the estimates is surprisingly wide," but many of the estimates suggest that half or
more of all gain permanently escapes the income tax. Id.
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problem) 8 should be characterized as retroactive. Such an application
occupies a middle ground between nominal retroactivity (applying the
change to income realized before the enactment of the new law) and
nominal pure prospectivity (applying the change only to income both
accrued and realized after enactment).
In the leading analysis of transitions in tax law, Michael Graetz has
argued that nothing is gained by arguments over whether a particular
change is retroactive, because all changes in tax law, even if nominally
purely prospective, are retroactive in the sense that they have an eco-
nomic impact on the value of existing assets. 9 Suppose the tax on capi-
tal gains at death is designed to exempt gains accruing before the
enactment of the tax. The fact that future appreciation in assets held at
enactment can no longer escape ultimate taxation will reduce somewhat
the value of those assets. This would be true even if assets held at en-
actment were holder-grandfathered, rendering even post-enactment ap-
preciation untaxable if the holder at enactment continued to hold until
death. The change in the law still would reduce the value of those as-
sets, because anyone acquiring an asset from the original owner would
not be eligible for the grandfather rule. The decrease in value of ex-
isting assets caused by a nominally prospective change in the law is
commonly referred to as a price change. 70 Graetz observes that carry-
over problems and price changes are "similar in their broadest eco-
nomic effects,"'71 and should be analyzed in the same fashion, as
reductions in the wealth of asset holders caused by a change in the
law.7
2
Under that general analysis, Graetz concludes that neither fairness
nor efficiency concerns mandates transition relief. On the fairness issue,
he notes that a taxpayer who buys a tax-favored asset buys it at a price
that reflects the possibility that Congress may some day repeal the
favorable treatment. In other words, he buys at a discount because of
68. David Bradford and U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 163-64
(U.S. G.P.O., 2d ed. 1984).
69. Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision,
126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47, 49-63 (1977). Graetz reiterates this point in Retroactivity Revisited, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 1820, 1822-23 (1985).
70. Bradford and Dept. of Treasury, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform at 163 (cited in note
68).
71. Graetz, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 51.
72. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 612-13
(1986), takes issue with Graetz's claim that carryover problems and price changes should be sub-
jected to the same transition analysis. He reasons that special transition rules for certain kinds of
accounting-related carryover problems may be necessary to avoid inappropriate nontaxation or
double taxation of income. (His example involves a required tax accounting change from a calen-




the possibility the tax law may change. The taxpayer is gambling that
the law will not change as long as he holds the property, but he knows
he may lose. If he happens to lose-if Congress does change the
law-no principle of fairness requires relief for one who knowingly as-
sumed the risk." On the efficiency issue, Graetz argues that if the
change in the law is itself an efficient change, it is inefficient to limit the
scope of that change by providing transition relief.7
4
My own view is that the two objections to the substantive argu-
ment for transition relief are persuasive. But the unanimity with which
Congress accepted transition relief for carryover basis suggests that the
political reality is that Congress will accept unquestioningly the sub-
stantive argument. One might draw a different conclusion from the his-
tory of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, in which Congress raised the top rate
on capital gains from twenty percent to twenty-eight percent without
providing any relief for gain which accrued under the twenty percent
tax but was realized under the twenty-eight percent tax.75 There is,
however, a long (albeit not particularly sensible) tradition of concern
about transitions when Congress adopts a new tax, but not when it in-
creases the rate of an existing tax. 6
73. Graetz, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 63-79. The argument is well summarized in J. Mark Ram-
seyer and Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors
Graetz and Kaplow, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1155, 1159-60 (1989).
74. Graetz remarks that transition rules "often significantly delay and sometimes perma-
nently reduce the benefits that are expected to be realized from the change in the law." Graetz, 98
Harv. L. Rev. at 1825 (cited in note 69). Ramseyer and Nakazato disagree with Graetz in part.
Their analysis indicates that it may improve efficiency for Congress to bind itself, at the time it
enacts a tax incentive, not to repeal the incentive without transition relief. Ramseyer and
Nakazato, 75 Va. L. Rev. at 1161-62 (cited in note 73). They concede, however, that there is no
efficiency advantage to transition relief if Congress did not promise it at the time of enactment. Id.
at 1162. Since Congress has not bound itself to transition relief if it repeals stepped up basis at
death, their analysis does not apply here. In addition, their analysis depends on Congress having
intended the tax preference as an incentive to invest in the tax-favored asset type. Neither history
nor logic makes a good case for Congress having intended the basis step up as incentive to buy
appreciating assets and hold them until death. See text accompanying notes 7-9. If Congress
lacked that intent, the analysis of Ramseyer and Nakazato is irrelevant here for that reason as
well.
75. Tax Reform Act of 1986, §§ 301-02, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2217-19.
76. Kaplow, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 610 (cited in note 72).
The implicit theory behind this view is that once a tax has been implemented, taxpayers can
expect changes (that is, they are on notice), whereas new taxes cannot reasonably be antici-
pated .... The distinction's relevance, if any, lies in its suggestion that these groups of re-
forms typically have different probabilities of enactment-a difference of degree that is of
limited significance. This assumed difference also does not hold in many contexts.
Id.
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C. Transition Relief Limited to Proof of Basis Concerns
Even in the rather unlikely event that Congress rejected substan-
tive transition relief, the procedural argument for relief would deserve
attention. Of course, one can argue that the possibility of a lifetime sale
or the enactment of a tax on capital gains at death means that taxpay-
ers should have kept meticulous cost records for all assets, but that is a
counsel of perfection with too little allowance for human frailty.
If transition relief is only for the purpose of accommodating under-
standable failure to keep good cost records, the relief should be quite
limited. This is especially true if rules of general applicability-that is,
applicable to assets acquired before or after the effective date-permit
reasonable estimates of basis and provide for basis equal to fair market
value at acquisition when cost cannot be determined. 7
As for the assets held on the date of enactment, however, it would
be sensible for a transition rule to isolate the assets for which failure to
keep basis records is particularly understandable. The most obvious
class of such assets is nonbusiness tangible personal property. The non-
business context of the acquisition and the unlikelihood (in most cases)
of a lifetime disposition at a gain make the lack of cost records particu-
larly likely in their case. Most of these assets probably would be exempt
from tax anyway, under a limited exemption for non-business tangible
personal property regardless of acquisition date,78 but some would be
too valuable to qualify for that exemption. Transition relief for those
assets could take the form of either determining basis by discounting
back from date of death value to the effective date,79 or simply a rule
providing that the basis is some stated percentage of the date of death
value of the property. Under either approach, the decedent's actual cost
would govern if higher than the basis determined under the special rule.
Similar relief could be provided to any number of other classes of assets
held on the effective date, 0 but the justification for failing to keep basis
records for any other asset type seems much weaker.8"
77. For a discussion of these rules, see text accompanying notes 137-40.
78. See text accompanying notes 253-68 for discussion.
79. This method is described at text accompanying notes 100-06.
80. The leading carryover basis clean-up bill would have applied the discount back approach
to all assets (other than marketable securities) held as of the effective date. H.R. 4694 § 2(a) (cited
in note 32) (proposed § 1023(d)(2)). This, however, was intended to be responsive to the substan-
tive claim for transition relief, as well as to the procedural claim.
81. Another category of assets for which transition relief might seem appropriate is assets
acquired when the decedent was older than some specified age, such as 70. The argument would be
that acquiring an asset at an advanced age makes it more likely that the decedent will hold it until
death, thus making the failure to keep cost records more understandable. One objection is that
there are some business and investment assets for which failure to keep cost records is never rea-
sonable, regardless of age. Another objection is that relief for such assets is not needed because, by
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The Congressional Budget Office has estimated the revenue effect
of a death gains tax that would allow, as transition relief, use of a basis
equal to one-half the date-of-death value of an asset.82 As a response
solely to proof of basis problems, this is too generous, since it would
apply even to business assets and other assets for which poor basis
records would not be excusable.8 3
Another possible response to the problem of proof of basis would
be to enact the tax with a delayed effective date-for example, to be
effective beginning with decedents who die three years after the date of
enactment.84 If a taxpayer had failed to keep basis records in anticipa-
tion of the benefit of Section 1014 at death, the delayed effective date
would give him at least three years before his death to work on estab-
lishing the basis of significant assets.8 5 Although this would no doubt
help in some cases, overall it seems both wildly underinclusive and
wildly overinclusive. It is underinclusive because in many cases the ba-
sis records simply are lost in the mists of history and cannot ever be
recovered, whether the taxpayer is alive or dead. It is overinclusive be-
cause during the deferral period it would forgive tax on billions of dol-
lars of gain for which there was little or no problem of basis
determination. 6 Moreover, the history of the delayed effective date of
carryover basis suggests that during the delay period the efforts of tax-
payers and their advisers will be focused on repealing the law, rather
than preparing to comply with it. On balance, the disadvantages of a
delayed effective date outweigh its rather limited advantage on the
proof of basis problem.
definition, they will have been acquired not long before the decedent's death, thus making the
problem of basis determination relatively simple.
82. Reducing the Deficit at 315-18 (cited in note 14). The Report is somewhat vague as to
whether this is intended as permanent or transition relief, but it appears to be only transitional.
Id. at 318.
83. As a response to the alleged need for substantive transition relief (i.e., the need not to tax
pre-effective date appreciation), it would be incoherent, since it does not attempt even to approxi-
mate the value of assets as of the effective date of the tax.
84. This possibility is mentioned in Michael J. Graetz, Taxation of Unrealized Gains at
Death-An Evaluation of the Current Proposals, 59 Va. L. Rev. 830, 854-55 (1973). Graetz rejects
this possibility because it assumes the deceased person retained basis records.
85. This justification for the delayed effective date suggests some special accommodation
should be made for taxpayers who are incompetent throughout much or all of the time between
the date of enactment and their death, and who die after the effective date. It seems unlikely,
however, that any accommodation would be worth the difficulty of administering it.
86. If Congress paired the new tax with a decrease in the capital gains rate or the estate tax
rates, Congress also would have to give the decrease a delayed effective date, in order to keep the
revenue effects in balance.
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D. Methods of Providing Substantive Transition Relief
If, as seems likely, Congress chooses to provide substantive transi-
tion relief, there are a number of ways it could do so. The most likely
options are discussed below.
1. National Appraisal Date
In theory, the purest method would be to step up the bases of all
appreciated assets to their fair market values on the effective date of
the capital gains at death tax, so that no pre-effective date appreciation
would be subject to the tax. This stepped-up basis would apply for pur-
poses of the death tax, but not for purposes of computing gain on dis-
positions during life. This national appraisal date approach was used
both when the income tax was introduced in 1913, and when the Cana-
dian capital gains tax was introduced in 1971.87
The basic problem with a national appraisal date, of course, is that
for most assets (marketable securities being the important exception),
determining value as of an appraisal date is difficult, expensive, uncer-"
tain, and contentious. Consider, for example, the question of when the
appraisals would be done. Appraisals performed at or about the time of
the effective date are more likely to be accurate than appraisals per-
formed years later (after the taxpayer's death), but the appraisal indus-
try could not possibly handle the job. It would be wasteful even to try,
since appraisals of any assets not held until death would be for naught.
And, even in a case in which the taxpayer did obtain a contemporane-
ous appraisal, the IRS could not be expected to review that appraisal
until the taxpayer's death years later. As a practical matter then, the
vast majority of effective date appraisals would have to be performed
years after the fact, thus adding one more element of uncertainty and
contention.8
Additional complexity comes from the fact that a national ap-
praisal date would not make the actual cost of pre-effective date assets
irrelevant for purposes of the death tax. Fairness requires that an exec-
utor be allowed to use actual cost as basis, rather than appraisal date
value, if the actual cost is higher.8 9 Thus, the difficulties inherent in
87. I.R.C. § 1053; I.T.A.R. 26(3) (1991).
88. A retrospective valuation date appraisal, made upon a taxable disposition of property, is
the standard practice in Canada. Interviews by the author with Revenue Canada officials in Ot-
tawa (July 16 and 17, 1992).
89. This was the approach of Section 1023(h). It is also the rule in Canada for purposes of
computing gain. I.T.A.R. 26(3). In Canada, if cost basis exceeds appraisal date value, appraisal
date value must be used for purposes of computing loss. Adoption of the same rule in the United
States would be consistent with the rationale of substantive transition relief: if pre-effective date
increases in value should not be subject to capital gains tax when realized upon a post-effective
[Vol. 46:361
TAXING GAINS
determining the cost of assets acquired before the effective date can
arise under an appraisal date system.90 In many cases,,however, it will
be clear that appraisal date value is greater than basis, so that no at-
tempt to prove basis will be needed.
There is one important respect in which use of a national appraisal
date actually might reduce disagreements between taxpayers and the
IRS. If a taxpayer dies owning property eligible for an appraisal date
basis, then both its appraisal date value and its death date value will be
at issue. The taxpayer's incentive is to argue for a high appraisal date
value and a low death date value; the government's incentive is the re-
verse. But to a large extent, arguments in favor of a high (or low) value
at one date also will tend to support a high (or low) value at the other
date. In some cases, this tendency may cause both parties to be more
reasonable in their claims than under a system in which only the date
of death value is at issue.
9 1
Canada's experience of more than two decades with a national ap-
praisal date system indicates such a system can work, although at con-
siderable administrative expense.92 That does not mean, however, that
it necessarily is worth the trouble. The supposed advantage of the ap-
praisal date over other forms of transition relief is its theoretical appro-
priateness, but in practice an appraisal date system is only suitable to
the extent the appraisals it produces are accurate. Given the difficulties
in obtaining accurate appraisals, especially years after the fact, the abil-
ity of an appraisal date system to supply precisely the appropriate tran-
sition relief is largely illusory. Weighing this largely illusory advantage
date death, then pre-effective date declines in value should not be deductible when realized at
death.
90. A related policy question is whether, if the appraisal date value exceeds cost basis, the
executor can use the appraisal date value only for computing gain, or also for computing loss. Since
the purpose of the appraisal date system is simply to prevent the taxation of pre-effective date
appreciation, the logical answer is that cost basis should be used for computing loss (and if the
date of death value is greater than cost basis but less than appraisal date value, there should be
neither gain nor loss). This is the Canadian rule, I.T.A.R. 26(3), and it was also the approach of
Section 1023(h). The proposed clean up of Section 1023 would have changed this rule to allow use
of appraisal date value for computing both gain and loss, but this was in response to the argument
that it was unduly burdensome to require heirs and beneficiaries to maintain dual basis records for
inherited assets over many years-an argument not applicable if the gain is taxed at death. H.R.
4694 § 2(a) (proposed § 1023(d)).
91. This point is made by Graetz, 59 Va. L. Rev. at 857 (cited in note 84). Revenue Canada
officials confirmed the existence of this effect. Interviews by author (cited in note 88).
92. Revenue Canada officials told the author that few, if any, appraisals were actually done
on or near the valuation date. Rather, appraisals as of the valuation date were done retrospectively
upon taxable dispositions of assets. Retrospective valuation of real estate has worked fairly well
because Revenue Canada constructed a massive data base of real estate sales near the valuation
date. Valuation of closely-held stock has been much more difficult. The officials thought, however,
that this would be less of a problem in the United States, because of the greater number of compa-
rable businesses. Interviews by author (cited in note 88).
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against the very real administrative costs, an appraisal date system does
not seem worthwhile.
2. Pro Rata Apportionment of Appreciation
The 1976 carryover basis legislation provided transition relief for
appreciated assets (other than marketable securities and personal and
household effects) by apportioning the appreciation in the property
evenly over the total time the taxpayer owned the property, and step-
ping up the basis by the amount of the appreciation apportioned to the
time before the effective date of the legislation. Suppose, for example,
the following facts: A taxpayer died four years after the effective date,
owning property he had acquired six years before the effective date; the
cost of the property was two dollars, and its value at death was $12. Of
the $10 appreciation, six dollars (sixty percent) would be apportioned
to before the effective date, and basis would be stepped up to eight
dollars.93 Following the enactment of carryover basis, the apportion-
ment method was criticized severely for failing to address the problem
of proof of basis for pre-enactment assets.9 4 Since the method requires
knowledge of cost basis, it was said not to ease the need for difficult-to-
find records of old transactions. 5 It even may have made the problem
worse, by requiring knowledge of acquisition date as well as cost. In
response to these criticisms, the defenders of carryover basis abandoned
apportionment and proposed replacing it with transition relief based on
the discount back method.9 6
The objections to apportionment were overstated, given that it
would provide substantial transition relief, even if no cost basis could
be established, as long as an approximate acquisition date was known.
Still, the relevance of cost basis meant that executors would be obliged
to make the effort to ascertain it. In any event, the universal disfavor
with which apportionment ultimately was viewed, by both attackers
and defenders of carryover basis, indicates it would not be a politically
feasible form of transition relief for a capital gains death tax.
Although history suggests the proof problems alone are enough to
doom apportionment, there are also substantive objections. It is, of
course, arbitrary to assume that assets appreciate as apportionment
93. This method was optional with the taxpayer under the British capital gains at death tax,
for most types of assets. Graetz, 59 Va. L. Rev. at 855 (cited in note 84).
94. See, for example, Estate and Gift Tax Carryover Basis and Generation-Skipping Trust
Provisions and Deductibility of Foreign Convention Expenses, Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977) ("Estate and Gift Tax Carryover Basis and
Generation-Skipping") (statement of John S. Pennell).
95. Id.
96. H.R. 4694 § 2(a) (proposed § 1023(d)(2)).
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deems. The law could assume, instead, that assets appreciate in a com-
pound manner, in the same way that interest accrues under the original
issue discount rules, 97 with the taxpayer-unfavorable result that less ap-
preciation would be allocated to early years and more to later years.
This probably would be more accurate in the aggregate, but it still
would be arbitrary with respect to particular assets.
As a response to the problem of arbitrariness, the law could give
executors the option of using either the greater of the basis determined
under apportionment or the actual value of the property as of the effec-
tive date." In order to exercise the option wisely, however, the executor
would need to know actual cost, date of acquisition, and appraisal date
value. In terms of administrative burden, then, such an option would be
the worst of all possible transition rules. Moreover, if there is an elec-
tion provision, there will be ill-advised elections, which will mean un-




The final proposal of the proponents of carryover basis was to pro-
vide transition relief by giving property a basis determined by discount-
ing back from the death value to the effective date at a statutorily
provided rate of interest."' Suppose, for example, the following situa-
tion: The taxpayer died one year after the effective date, owning an
asset which he owned as of the effective date; the asset was worth $104
at his death, and the applicable interest rate was four percent. The dis-
count back would produce a basis of $100. The proposal also provided
that the basis determined under the discount back method could not be
less than twenty-five percent of the date of death value."0 ' This method
would apply to all assets except marketable securities, which would be
given a basis equal to their trading price as of the valuation date.102
Preferred stock ineligible to participate in corporate growth was treated
97. I.R.C. § 1272(a).
98. This was suggested by representatives of shopping center owners in the hearings on
cleaning up carryover basis. Estate and Gift Tax Carryover Basis and Generation-Skipping at
129-31 (statement of the International Council of Shopping Centers). This option was available
under the British capital gains death tax. Graetz, 59 Va. L. Rev. at 855-56.
99. Graetz reports that both the need to compute two different bases and the problem of ill-
advised elections proved to be serious difficulties under the British tax. 59 Va. L. Rev. at 856.
100. H.R. 4694 § 2(a) (cited in note 32) (proposed § 1023(d)(2)).
101. Id. (proposed § 1023(d)(2)(B)).
102. Canada, which used value as of the national appraisal date as the transition rule for all
assets, see note 89, nevertheless treated marketable securities somewhat differently from other
assets. Although the valuation date for other assets (December 31, 1971) was announced in ad-
vance, the exact valuation date for marketable securities (December 22, 1971) was announced only
after the end of the year. This secrecy was intended to prevent manipulation of the value of thinly
3851993]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
as a marketable security for this purpose because it was unreasonable to
assume such stock would have appreciated over time.103 In addition, the
proposal would have created regulatory authority to treat "certain other
property" like marketable securities, if as of the effective date the prop-
erty "had a value which was readily ascertainable (whether because of a
buy-sell agreement, a redemption value, or otherwise) by a method
other than appraisal.' 10
Under the discount back method there still would be the option of
establishing a cost basis greater than the discount back basis, so even
this approach would not eliminate totally problems of determining his-
torical basis. 105 But the method enables the executor to establish a sub-
stantial basis in every case (assuming there is a percentage floor
provided by the statute), without the need for any evidence of historical
cost or acquisition date (except that the acquisition date must be before
the effective date). In addition, as the proponents of the method (in-
cluding the Treasury) pointed out, in most cases an executor can easily
make an educated guess as to whether it is worth the trouble of trying
to determine the cost basis (that is, as to whether there is a serious
possibility that the cost basis significantly exceeds the discount back
basis) .106
The method is undeniably somewhat arbitrary, both in its basic ap-
proach and in the choice of discount rate and minimum basis (if any).
But it is also undeniably administrable, and it provides significant tran-
sition relief. If Congress is to provide substantive transition relief at all,
discount back is the least objectionable means of doing so.
4. Complete Grandfathering
The most taxpayer-favorable transition relief would be complete
grandfathering of any asset that a taxpayer owned on the effective date
and continued to own until his death. Such assets would not be subject
to the tax on gains at death, and would receive a fair market value basis
at death. Some opponents of carryover basis suggested this when it ap-
traded shares through sales at artificial prices on the valuation date. Even with this technique,
determining the appraisal date values of thinly traded marketable securities has been difficult.
103. H.R. 4694 § 2(a) (proposed § 1023(d)(4)).
104. Id. (proposed § 1023(d)(5)).
105. The method also could be combined with an option to use appraisal date value as basis,
if higher than discount back basis. However, for the reasons discussed in text accompanying notes
98-99 (concerning an option to use either pro rata apportionment or appraisal date), that would
not be a good idea.
106. Carryover Basis, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management,
Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1979) ("Carryover Basis") (statement of Donald C.
Lubick, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy).
[Vol. 46:361
TAXING GAINS
peared that carryover basis would survive in some form,107 but it was
adopted by proponents only as an unsuccessful last-minute desperation
alternative to complete repeal.108 It is, of course, extremely responsive
to both the substantive and procedural claims for transition relief.109
It is almost impossible, however, to imagine a convincing argument
that post-effective date appreciation deserves to escape the tax, merely
because the asset was acquired before the law was enacted. The hori-
zontal inequity between the holders of grandfathered and non-
grandfathered assets would be glaring. In fact, the proponents of com-
plete grandfathering did not seriously attempt to justify such a sweep-
ing exemption on any grounds other than simplicity of administration.
Discount back transition relief is nearly as easy to administer, however,
without being so bizarrely generous. In addition, grandfathering creates
a severe lock-in effect for the grandfathered assets.110  Finally,
grandfathering invites the abuse of "aging" assets to exploit the loop-
hole. For example, a taxpayer might transfer (in a nonrecognition trans-
action) an appreciated nongrandfathered asset to a corporation
controlled by the taxpayer, the stock of which is a grandfathered as-
set.111 Absent effective anti-abuse rules, this would convert the non-
grandfathered asset into a grandfathered asset. It might not be impossi-
ble for Congress to write and for the IRS to enforce anti-aging rules,
but it certainly would not be easy.
A strong believer in taxing capital gains at death might accept com-
plete grandfathering as the only way of getting the reform .enacted,1
and an opponent might accept it as the next best thing to no reform at
all. As a political compromise, it is not unlikely. On the merits, how-
ever, it is significantly inferior to the discount back approach.
107. Estate and Gift Tax Carryover Basis and Generation-Skipping at 22 (cited in note 94)
(letter of Frederick S. Lane); id. at 84 (statement of Frank S. Berall).
108. 126 Cong. Rec. H12149 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1979) (statement of Rep. Fisher).
109. However, as explained in text accompanying notes 68-72, it does not eliminate the price
change issue.
110. The lock-in would be worse than under current law, because one could not sell the
grandfathered asset and replace it with another asset whose future appreciation would be eligible
for a tax-free basis step-up at death.
111. The abuse is most apparent if the asset is appreciated when it is transferred to the
corporation, but even if the asset is not appreciated at that time, the transfer makes future appre-
ciation in the asset eligible for grandfathering, which it should not be.
112. Of course, it would decrease significantly the revenue from taxing gains at death for
many years. If the tax were part of a revenue neutral package (including a decrease in the capital
gains rate or in the estate tax), grandfathering would mean the taxpayer-favorable part of the




The new tax could be implemented gradually-for example, only
20% of gain realized at death might be taxed during the first year after
enactment, 40% during the second year, and so on. The 1963 Treasury
proposal to tax gains at death included a proposal for phased-in imple-
mentation. 113 Whatever may be the merits of this form of transition re-
lief in other circumstances,' 1 4 it makes little sense here. It is
unresponsive to the procedural claim for transition relief, because it re-
quires proof of basis in every case. 1 5 It also is unresponsive to the sub-
stantive argument that pre-enactment appreciation should not be
taxed, because it makes no attempt to distinguish between pre- and
post-enactment appreciation. To the extent the tax has been phased in,
it taxes both.
IV. How SERIOUS ARE PROOF OF BASIS PROBLEMS?
A. The Flow of the Argument
During the hearings that led to the repeal of carryover basis, many
opponents of Section 1023 cited the need to determine a decedent's ba-
sis in his assets as the single biggest practical problem with carryover
basis-even for assets acquired after the effective date of the legisla-
tion." ' Many argued the problem was so serious as to make carryover
basis impractical. If they were right, then taxing capital gains at
death-which also requires determination of a decedent's asset ba-
sis-is impractical for the same reason.
The obvious response to this argument is that dispositions of assets
during life always have required proof of basis,"' and that the system
has proved workable. If determining basis on dispositions during life is
practical, determining basis at death also must be practical.
This response was met in turn with several responses. Some argued
that determining basis of assets disposed of during life was practical
only because the taxpayer was available to help reconstruct basis
113. President's 1963 Tax Message at 140 (cited in note 25).
114. For examples of its use, see the 1986 Tax Reform Act's transition rules for the disallow-
ance of passive losses and investment interest expense. I.R.C. §§ 469(m)(2), 163(d)(6).
115. Graetz, 59 Va. L. Rev. at 854-55 (cited in note 84). It does lessen the consequences of
failure to prove basis for deaths during the phase-in period, however.
116. The most complete development of this argument was by the American Bankers Associ-
ation. See, for example, Carryover Basis Provisions at 79-101 (cited in note 34) (giving the results
of a survey of banks on the difficulties of proving basis).
117. In the case of most dispositions, proof of basis is needed to compute gain or loss realized




records, and that determining basis after the taxpayer's death thus
would be impractical. 18 This is not persuasive. It is not plausible that
taxpayers can keep large quantities of complex basis records in their
heads, so that the information is available during their lives, but disap-
pears at death." 9 The overwhelming bulk of important basis informa-
tion is in forms that do not die with the taxpayer.
There are, however, three somewhat more persuasive responses.
First, it may be that taxpayers take proof of basis problems into ac-
count in deciding which assets to hold until death, so that the assets
which pass at death tend to be those with the worst proof of basis
problems.2 0 Second, proof of basis problems that may be manageable
when only a few assets are disposed of in any given year during life,
may become overwhelming when all assets are deemed to have been
disposed of at death. Third, a taxpayer who sells an asset with an un-
provable basis during life can choose to accept gracefully a zero basis,
but an executor faced with a deemed disposition of the same asset at
death might be under a fiduciary obligation to attempt to establish a
basis.'
2'
There is a reply to these responses: that most of the proof of basis
problems that would be encountered by executors of decedents dying
today, if those executors were required to prove basis, would be due to
decedents having failed to keep adequate basis records in reliance on
Section 1014. One can criticize such reliance, because a taxpayer can
never be certain he will be able to hold a particular asset until death.
Still, it is understandable that in many cases a taxpayer would expect
to hold certain assets until death, and therefore would fail to keep basis
records for those assets. But if a gains tax were enacted, this reason for
failing to keep basis records (for significant assets acquired after the
effective date of the new law) would disappear, with two consequences:
most taxpayers would begin to keep good basis records for all signifi-
cant assets, and those who did not would deserve the consequence of a
zero basis upon a deemed disposition at death.122
118. Carryover Basis Provisions at 161, 173 (statements of the American Bar Association).
119. Further, even if a taxpayer claimed to remember such information, it is unlikely that
the IRS or the courts would believe him.
120. The case of taxpayers holding assets until death in order to avoid proof of basis
problems is a seldom-noted aspect of the lock-in effect of Section 1014.
121. It may be true that a fiduciary could not give up as quickly as the taxpayer himself
might, but there would come a point (probably fairly quickly) at which it is obvious that basis
could not be established without unreasonable expense. At that point, it would be the executor's
fiduciary duty not to attempt to establish basis.
122. Although they would merit that result, they still might avoid it under a rule allowing a
basis equal to fair market value at acquisition date.
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B. Some Comments on the Arguments
After having read hundreds of pages of wildly conflicting testimony
on the proof of basis problems of carryover basis under Section 1023, it
still is difficult to judge the seriousness of the problem. Some witnesses
claimed proof of basis problems were manageable; others claimed the
problems made the system unworkable. It is true, as some legislators
enjoyed pointing out, that most of the assertions that the problems
were not serious did not come from the workers in the trenches.
123
Rather, they came mostly from academics and from elite practitioners
(especially former high-ranking government tax officials) who did not
deal with such mundane problems on a regular basis.1
2 4
By contrast, the claims that proof problems were severe were better
documented and came more from those with first-hand experience. Par-
ticularly impressive in scope was the American Bankers Association's
survey of its members, which generated 200 replies representing experi-
ence with more than 5000 estates.1 5 The survey summary indicated
that proof of basis problems were not limited to esoteric assets or care-
less taxpayers, and that proof of basis was difficult or impossible for a
substantial part of the assets in between one-third and two-thirds of all
estates. 126 Problems tended to be most severe in smaller estates. 2 7 The
survey revealed that bases of chattels, intangibles, and improvements to
real estate were especially problematic, but that even marketable secur-
ities frequently presented difficulties. 128 The survey summary estimated
that carryover basis increased the total bank time required to adminis-
ter estates by twenty percent.
29
There are reasons, however, to treat the survey results with some
skepticism. First, they relate primarily to assets acquired before Section
1023 was enacted. 130 Therefore, they do not indicate whether record-
123. During the 1979 hearings, Rep. Frenzel pointedly asked three former government tax
officials, who had testified that proof of basis problems were manageable, how many farmers they
represented in their practice. Carryover Basis Provisions at 144 (cited in note 34). Rep. Conable
remarked that their testimony "illustrat[ed] the old principle, once a taxman always a taxman."
Id.
124. Witnesses in this category included Donald C. Alexander, id. at 143; Sheldon S. Cohen,
id. at 24; James B. Lewis, id. at 133; and John S. Nolan, id. at 102. There were, however, a few
other witnesses in private practice who said that proof of basis problems were exaggerated. These
included Bernard Barnett, id. at 267, and David E. Watts, id. at 249.
125. Id. at 79-101.
126. Id. at 80.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 47 (discussing intangibles and marketable securities); id. at 80 (discussing chattels
and real estate improvements).
129. Id. at 96.
130. The pro rata allocation transition rule of Section 1023(h)(2) required knowledge of the
cost basis of pre-1976 assets.
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keeping would have improved for assets acquired after the effective
date. Second, the information came from an organization strongly op-
posed to carryover basis, thus raising the question of whether the infor-
mation had been slanted to support the organization's agenda. 13 1
A fair overall evaluation of proof of basis problems at death proba-
bly would be along the following lines. Certainly the need to establish
basis at death will raise significant problems in some cases, but it
should be possible to muddle through satisfactorily, especially with re-
spect to the investment assets containing most of the appreciation.
Even if the twenty percent of additional estate administration time
claimed by the American Bankers Association was not inflated, it is not
horrendous for the early experience with proving basis at death. That
figure could be expected to drop substantially over time, as more and
more assets held at death were acquired after the effective date of the
new legislation. (It would not be so high even at the beginning, if the
transition rule did not require proof of basis for pre-effective date as-
sets.) The bankers nevertheless claimed that anyone who thought rec-
ord-keeping would improve dramatically after the change in the law
was living in a "dream world. 1'312 The most basic response is that tax
policy should not be held hostage to taxpayers' refusal to comply with
reasonable record-keeping rules. If taxing gains at death makes good
policy sense, and if the record-keeping burden is not unreasonable, then
the refusal of some taxpayers to keep records should not be a bar to
changing the law. If decedents do not leave their executors adequate
basis records, even after notice that records will be required, there is
nothing wrong with computing their gain using zero bases. It also is
worth noting the great improvements since the late 1970s in the availa-
bility, cost, and user-friendliness of computer technology; software
could be developed quickly to make basis record-keeping much easier
than it would have been in the carryover basis era.
The Canadian experience over the past two decades with taxing
capital gains at death has been that establishing basis is simply not a
major problem. The Treasury reported this experience to Congress dur-
131. It is interesting that the American Bankers Association's position on the AET changed
from grudging acceptance in 1977 as "the most satisfactory change in the basis rule if a change
from prior law must continue in the future," Estate and Gift Tax Carryover Basis and Genera-
tion-Skipping at 50 (cited in note 94), to outright opposition in 1979, id. at 77. The opposition in
1979 to any proposal requiring proof of basis at death might have been due to unexpectedly bad
experience with proof of basis problems under carryover basis, id. at 80 (stating problems were
worse than anticipated), but it also might have been a response to a change in the political climate.
That is, the bankers may have accepted reluctantly the AET when they thought some sort of
change in the treatment of gains at death was inevitable, but they may have opposed it in 1979
because they saw a real opportunity to return to total forgiveness of gains tax at death.
132. Id. at 42.
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ing the hearings on carryover basis, s13 and Revenue Canada officials
confirmed this account to the author in 1992.1" The officials reported
significant asset valuation problems, of the sort common in the United
States in the administration of the estate tax, but they stated that
proof of basis problems were trivial in comparison. In fact, they found
it difficult to believe that alleged proof of basis problems played a lead-
ing role in the repeal of carryover basis. 3 5 In light of the history of the
death gains tax administration in Canada, it is difficult to take seriously
the argument that problems of basis determination make a death gains
tax impractical.
C. Limited Responses to Proof of Basis Problems
Although proof of basis problems do not make a death gains tax
impractical, they do call for certain limited legislative responses, noted
below.
1. Value at Acquisition Alternative
Revenue Canada officials indicated that it was sometimes necessary
to arrive at a basis figure by estimating the value of an asset as of its
acquisition date."3" This confirms the desirability of allowing value at
acquisition as basis, when cost cannot be established.
3 7
2. Allowing Estimates
An executor's inability to establish cost basis to the exact dollar
should not lead to a zero basis if he can establish approximate cost with
reasonable accuracy. One would hope the IRS would administer the law
in this way even without explicit guidance, but it.could not hurt to in-
clude a statement in the legislative history, or even in the statute itself,
that the IRS and the courts must accept reasonable estimates of ba-
sis.138 One way of making this point would be to say that the spirit of
the Cohan rule' 39-allowing taxpayers to deduct estimated business en-
133. Id. at 12-13 (statement of Donald C. Lubick).
134. Interviews by author (cited in note 88).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. I.R.C. Section 1023(g)(3) provided for this alternative, and I.R.C. Section 1015(a) has
long included a similar rule for determining the basis of property acquired by gift.
138. Consider the following comment of Rep. Conable and the response of James B. Lewis, in
Estate and Gift Tax Carryover Basis and Generation-Skipping at 243 (cited in note 94): "My
impression is, if we were relying on the goodwill of the IRS to assume a reasonable basis for some-
thing, we would be relying on something that was ephemeral indeed."
"I think that is right unless you get a real statutory foundation there."
139. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1930).
392 [Vol. 46:361
TAXING GAINS
tertainment expenses despite the absence of detailed records-applies
with respect to proof of basis at death. 4"
3. Nonbusiness Tangible Personal Property
This is probably the area in which the greatest proof problems can
be expected. As discussed elsewhere in this Article,' 4 1 a liberal exemp-
tion (either aggregate, or item-by-item) should obviate most of these
problems. As a practical matter, in any case in which: (a) the fair mar-
ket value at death is great enough to exceed significantly the exemption
amount, and (b) basis cannot be established, basis is likely to be very
low. This is due to the fact that even for nonbusiness tangible personal
property, taxpayers are likely to keep records of expensive purchases.
Inability to prove a trivially low basis has, of course, no significant tax
consequences. In the hearings on carryover basis, one witness lamented
the fact that his executor probably would be unable to prove his $50
basis in a highly appreciated painting.142 Neither the witness nor any of
the legislators noted that the tax difference between a zero basis and a
$50 basis is trivial ($14, under a twenty-eight percent capital gains tax).
4. Farms and Closely-Held Businesses
The proof of basis issues for farms and small businesses differ
somewhat, depending on the form of ownership of the business. If it is
in C corporation form, there is probably little at stake in proof of basis,
because stockholders will tend to have very low bases in closely-held C
corporations financed with retained earnings over many years. 143 In ad-
dition, as witnesses on carryover basis noted, generally basis can be
"backed out" from corporate books (kept on an historical cost basis)
and perhaps old income tax returns.1
4 4
If the farm or business is a sole proprietorship, most basis informa-
tion should be readily available. The basis of depreciable assets must be
known in order to claim depreciation deductions, and the basis of in-
ventory must be known in order to compute income from anticipated
sales. Given the generous expensing rules for farms, 45 the basis of most
other assets will be zero.
140. Note, however, that the Cohan rule was overruled in the context in which it was devel-
oped. I.R.C. § 274(d).
141. See text accompanying notes 254-68.
142. Carryover Basis Provisions at 260 (cited in note 34) (statement of Billy R. Carter).
143. Basis may not be low if the stock recently was inherited by the decedent, but in that
case records of the previous estate tax value of the stock should be readily available.
144. Carryover Basis Provisions at 106 (statement of John S. Nolan).




If the farm or business is owned as a pass-through entity (partner-
ship or S corporation), partner or shareholder basis records must be
maintained in order to determine the tax consequences of distributions
to the owners. 46 Ordinarily basis can be determined easily from the in-
formation on the owner's K-1 forms.
In short, any argument against taxing gains at death, grounded on
basis record-keeping difficulties for farms and small businesses, is com-
pletely unpersuasive. It is unacceptable for any business to argue it
should not be expected to keep adequate cost records. The real argu-
ment against taxing farm and small business appreciation at death is
substantive; the alleged record-keeping problems are a smokescreen.
5. Basis Allocation for Related Assets
In some cases involving a set of related assets, such as a stamp or
coin collection, it may be practical to determine the total basis of the
set (that is, the taxpayer may have kept track of the total amount spent
on the collection), but it may be difficult or impossible to determine the
basis of individual assets within the set. The same problem can arise
with investments in stocks or mutual funds under a dividend reinvest-
ment plan. This was a significant problem under carryover basis. Elec-
tive averaging of basis among related assets was suggested as a relief
measure, 4 7 but even then a conscientious fiduciary would have to at-
tempt actual cost allocations (when that would serve to allocate higher
basis to assets likely to be sold first). This is one of the situations in
which taxing gains at death is easier to administer than carryover basis.
As long as all capital gain at death is treated as long term, 4 8 and all
gain or loss is recognized at death, it makes no practical difference how
the total basis of a group of assets is allocated within the group.
Whatever the allocation, the net capital gain or loss will be the same.
Thus, taxing gains at death eliminates the problem of allocating basis
within a group of related assets.
149
146. I.R.C. §§ 731, 1368.
147. Background and Issues at 22 (cited in note 30); H.R. 4694 § 2(a) (proposed §
1023(e)(1)).
148. All capital gains and losses at death should be treated as long term, regardless of the
actual holding periods. This was a feature of the 1969 Treasury proposal. Ways and Means Comm.,
Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 340 (1969) ("Tax Reform Studies and
Proposals").
149. This would not be true if some of the assets went to the surviving spouse (thus qualify-
ing for carryover basis) while other assets were taxed at death. It is always, however, within the
power of the decedent or the executor to avoid this problem simply by providing that the surviving
spouse receive either all or none of the assets within the group.
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V. THE STRUCTURE OF A GAINS TAx AT DEATH
This Article now considers a number of important policy choices
and technical issues that will arise in designing a gains tax at death.
A. Exemptions Based on Destinations of Assets
1. Should There Be a Marital Exemption?
During hearings on the adoption of carryover basis, a number of
witnesses advised Congress that taxation of capital gains at death with
an exemption for marital bequests would be as complicated as-or even
worse than-carryover basis. 150 Much of the alleged complexity of car-
ryover basis came from the fact that asset bases would remain uncer-
tain until a bequest to a surviving spouse had been fully funded. This is
because assets that qualified for the estate tax marital deduction were
not entitled to share in the basis increase on account of death taxes.'15'
A tax on capital gains at death with a marital exemption-in effect a
hybrid system, with tax at death for some assets and carryover basis for
others-would generate complexity and uncertainty in the same way.
Until the funding of the marital bequest was completed, the income tax
liability generated by the death could not be calculated. 152 And because
the income tax liability would be deductible under the estate tax, this
uncertainty also would delay the determination of the estate tax liabil-
ity.153 In order to avoid this complication, the "additional estate tax"
150. Federal Estate and Gift Taxes at 1211, 1218-19 (cited in note 38) (statement of Richard
Covey); Estate and Gift Tax Carryover Basis and Generation-Skipping at 237 (cited in note 94)
(statement of James B. Lewis).
151. I.R.C. §§ 1023(c), (0(4), repealed by the Windfall Profit Tax § 401(a), Pub. L. No. 96-
223, (1980). Clean up would have addressed this problem by allowing marital deduction property
to share in the death tax basis increase. H.R. 4694 § 2(a) (proposed § 1023(c)(4)). This solution was
criticized on equity grounds-i.e., that property which did not bear a death tax burden did not
deserve a death tax basis increase. Carryover Basis Provisions at 50-51 (cited in note 34) (state-
ment of American Bankers Association).
152. Although the estate tax marital deduction also depends on what is actually transferred
from the estate to the surviving spouse, only the values of the assets transferred are relevant to the
tax liability, not their bases. Thus, under present law estate tax liability can be computed without
knowing precisely which assets will go to the surviving spouse, as long as the total value going to
the surviving spouse is known.
153. If the marital bequest is to be determined under a zero-estate tax formula, a marital
exemption from the gains tax is somewhat complex even if all assets have a uniform basis. The
complication is that of interdependent calculations: the amount bequeathed to the surviving
spouse depends on the amount of the gains tax liability, and the amount of the gains tax liability
depends on the amount bequeathed to the surviving spouse. For an example of this criticism, see
Estate and Gift Taxes, Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 100
(1976) ("Estate and Gift Tax Hearings") (statement of American Bankers Association). In fact,
however, the computation required is not particularly difficult. Suppose, for example, the follow-
ing: the estate consists of capital assets with a total value of $1,000,000 and a basis of zero; the
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(AET) reluctantly advanced by the American Bankers Associa-
tionl'5 -really a low-rate income tax (not deductible against the regular
estate tax) imposed on capital gains at death-did not provide for a
marital exemption. 55
In light of the unlimited marital deduction in the estate and gift
taxes,'15 and the nonrecognition rule of Section 1041 on lifetime trans-
fers between spouses,157 it appears there is a robust political consensus
that transfers between spouses-either inter vivos or testamentary-are
not appropriate occasions for the imposition of tax.158 If this consensus
exists, then a tax on capital gains at death is politically possible only if
the administrative complexities of a marital exemption can be over-
come.15 9 Even putting politics aside, the idea that transfers between
estate tax exemption amount is $600,000; the capital gains rate is 20%; and the bequest to the
surviving spouse is the minimum amount necessary to reduce the estate tax liability to zero, taking
into account the estate tax exemption amount and the estate tax deduction for the capital gains
tax liability created by death. The amount of the marital bequest depends on the capital gains tax,
and the amount of the gains tax depends on the amount of the bequest. The formula to determine
the amount of the bequest is: $1,000,000 - 0.20($1,000,000 - X) -X = $600,000. This reduces to X
= $250,000. A marital bequest of $250,000 results in a capital gains tax of $150,000 on gain of
$750,000, and together the marital deduction and the gains tax liability deduction reduce the taxa-
ble estate to the $600,000 exemption amount.
Of course, it would not be quite that simple in real life. Complications could arise for various
reasons, including the strong probability that the assets in an estate will not have a uniform basis
(unless the law requires basis reallocation). Even with complications, however, this is hardly
calculus. Although the calculations may be daunting to some executors (and even some lawyers),
they should not be challenging to any competent accountant. Moreover, it is likely that computer
software to make the task easier would appear quickly.
154. For details of the proposal, see id. at 62-63, 90-113. The tax rate under the AET would
have been significantly lower than the rate imposed on capital gains realized during life. This
difference was intended to compensate for the fact that the AET was not deductible'against the
regular estate tax, rather than to compensate for the lack of a marital exemption. Id. at 105-07.
155. Michael Graetz proposed a system with a marital exemption for inter vivos spousal
transfers, but not for bequests. Graetz, 59 Va. L. Rev. at 845 (cited in note 84). As with the AET,
this conflicts with the consensus that has developed sinde the 1970s that transfers between
spouses, during life or at death, are not appropriate occasions for tax. In addition, it would require
some sort of anti-avoidance provision to deal with transfers in contemplation of death, which could
be a substantial complication.
156. See I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523.
157. Or even between former spouses, if incident to a divorce. I.R.C. § 1041(a)(2).
158. A marital exemption is assumed by the Congressional Budget Office in Reducing the
Deficit at 315 (cited in note 14).
159. A possible response to the conclusion that allowing a marital exemption is theoretically
proper but too difficult to administer, would be to enact the tax without a marital exemption, but
with a lower rate than for other capital gains to compensate for the lack of an exemption. (This
lower rate thus would be conceptually different from the lower rate under the AET, which was
designed to compensate for the nondeductibility against the estate tax of the AET tax.) This re-
sponse is unappealing. If one believes that allowing a marital deduction is conceptually correct,
this trade-off may be fair from the government's standpoint, but it is not fair to individual estates:
the detriment of no exemption is borne entirely by estates with surviving spouse beneficiaries,
while the benefit of the lower rate goes largely to other estates.
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spouses should be ignored for tax purposes-i.e., that a married couple
(or a surviving spouse and an estate) generally should be treated as a
single entity for tax purposes-has considerable appeal.16 0
There is, of course, significant revenue loss generated by the defer-
ral caused by a marital exemption. The median time that widows sur-
vive their husbands is about eleven years.161 If, however, one believes
that allowing a marital exemption is conceptually correct, one views this
deferral as simply part of the proper structure of the tax, rather than as
a revenue loss. In any event, the revenue loss is basically a transition
issue, since eventually the tax deferred on transfers to surviving spouses
will be roughly offset by gains realized on the deaths of other widows
and widowers.
The crucial question, then, is whether the critics were right in
claiming that a capital gains death tax with a marital exemption would
be unworkably complex. At the outset, it is important to note that a
capital gains death tax with a marital exemption certainly would not
involve all the complexities of carryover basis under Section 1023.
Property passing to a surviving spouse under the capital gains death tax
would receive a pure carryover basis, without any minimum basis ad-
justment,6 2 with no death tax adjustment, 6 3 and with no fresh start
adjustment. 6 4 In addition, the carryover basis records would need to be
maintained only until the death of the surviving spouse, rather than
over many generations, as could be required under Section 1023.
In many ways, then, a marital exemption to the tax on gains at
death would be much less complex than universal carryover basis.
There remains, however, the one important complication that the two
systems do share: the inability to determine the tax consequences of the
decedent's death until the marital bequest has been fully funded. Even
as to this problem, there is an important difference between Section
160. However, the fact that property passing at death to a surviving spouse receives a fair
market value basis under current law is inconsistent with the premise that a married couple should
be treated as a single entity. This point is made in Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth
Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1183, 1235-36 (1983).
161. Tax Reform Studies and Proposals at 360 (cited in note 148). At a discount rate of
seven percent or higher, deferring a tax for 11 years reduces the present value of the tax burden to
less than half of the stated amount (at a seven percent discount rate, the present value of a dollar
due in 11 years is 47.5 cents).
162. Whatever minimum basis or similar relief was provided by the tax with respect to the
exempt property should be determined when and if the surviving spouse died owning the property.
See text accompanying notes 250-53.
163. The property passing to the surviving spouse would have generated no estate tax, and so
would receive no basis adjustment.
164. A fresh start adjustment would be appropriate upon the death of the surviving spouse,
if the two spouses together had held the property since before the effective date of the tax. There
would be no need to make the adjustment, however, until the surviving spouse's death.
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1023 and a tax at death. The problem under Section 1023 was that of a
"suspended basis" when an asset was sold during the administration of
the estate. The sale was clearly an event triggering recognition of gain
or loss, but the amount of gain or loss could not be computed because
the basis of the asset depended on events yet to occur (the funding of
the marital bequest). This created two problems. First, it was difficult
for the executor to make an informed decision about which assets to sell
when the bases of the assets were unknown. Second, the fact that later
events would affect the bases of assets sold made numerous amended
returns and refund claims inevitable.'65
By contrast, under a capital gains tax at death with a marital ex-
emption, the uncertainty is not as to the basis of assets sold, but as to
which assets are subject to gain (or loss) recognition at death. 6 ' As long
as the marital bequest is fully funded before the income tax and estate
tax returns are due, there is no problem. This differs from Section 1023,
under which there was a problem any time an asset was sold before the
marital bequest was funded.
This suggests two possible approaches. The first approach would
permit a decedent's return to claim the exemption only for assets actu-
ally distributed to the surviving spouse by the time the return is filed,
but with the return date late enough that distribution by the due date
is practical. The final income tax return, and the estate tax return,
should be due long enough after death that in the vast majority of cases
the marital bequest can be fully funded by the time the returns are due.
If (as seems likely) the current estate tax return due date of nine
months after death 6 ' is inadequate for that purpose, practitioner
groups should present the evidence of that inadequacy to Congress and
suggest what due date would be appropriate. In the unusual case in
which funding cannot be completed before the due date, a reasonable
165. The funding of the marital bequest was not the only later event that could affect the
basis of assets sold. Because of the statute's rules for the allocation of the death tax basis adjust-
ment among assets, a change on audit in the estate tax value of any asset could change the Section
1023 basis of every asset. See I.R.C. § 1023(c),(e).
166. James B. Lewis remarked that taxation of gains at death, with a marital exemption,
would present executors with the problem of "unknown basis" of assets prior to the funding of the
marital bequest. Estate and Gift Tax Carryover Basis and Generation-Skipping at 237 (cited in
note 94). If he meant that executors would not know the basis of any assets sold during the admin-
istration of the estate, he was not correct (at least with respect to the marital exemption proposed
in this Article). The marital exemption would apply only to property received in kind by the sur-
viving spouse (or a qualififying spousal trust). Any asset sold by the executor during the adminis-
tration of the estate will have been subject to the gains tax at death (even if the proceeds of the
sale are used to fund the marital bequest), and so will have a basis equal to fair market value at
death for purposes of determining gain or loss on the executor's sale. Thus, the very fact of the sale
by the executor determines that the property does not qualify for the marital exemption.
167. I.R.C. § 6075(a).
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extension of time to file should be granted. A first extension might be
granted automatically, with additional extensions granted upon a show-
ing of reasonable cause. If the six month limitation on extensions im-
posed by Section 6081 is considered inadequate for this purpose,
Congress could enact a special longer limitation. Interest would run, of
course, from the original due date of the returns. As an alternative to
the above, Congress could address the problem entirely with extension
provisions, rather than with a change in the basic due date of nine
months after death. Under this alternative, interest would begin to run
after nine months, rather than at some later point.
Under either of the above variations, there seldom should be a case
in which the returns must be filed before the marital bequest is fully
funded. If such a case nevertheless should arise, the income and estate
taxes both should be computed by exempting from the income tax only
those assets actually distributed to the surviving spouse by the time the
return is filed. If additional assets are distributed before the expiration
of the statute of limitations, amended returns could be filed.16 8
The other possible approach would be to permit returns to claim
tentative exemptions for assets that the executor reasonably anticipates
eventually will be distributed to the surviving spouse (within some
specified time, such as three years after the date of death). If the actual
distribution differs from that anticipated by the return, an amended
return would be required. This technique-of allowing returns to be
filed in anticipation of an act qualifying a gain for nonrecognition-is
already in use with respect to involuntary conversions and replacements
of personal residences.169
Under either of these approaches-delayed return filing or filing
based on anticipated distributions-a death gains tax with a marital
deduction seems workable. Moreover, such a system has proven itself
workable in twenty years of Canadian experience. The Canadian tax on
capital gains at death exempts appreciation in marital bequests, and
uses a "wait and see" approach to determine what property qualifies for
the exemption. 170 The exemption applies to property that has become
"indefeasibly vested" in the surviving spouse within thirty-six months
168. Distribution of additional appreciated property to the surviving spouse would increase
the income tax liability and (by a lesser amount) decrease the estate tax liability.
169. With respect to involuntary conversions, see I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(C) and Treas. Reg. §
1.1033(a)-2(c)(2). With respect to personal residences, see I.R.C. § 1034(j), and instructions for
I.R.S. Form 2119. See also I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A) (concerning the consequences of acquiring a pro-
hibited interest in a corporation within 10 years of a stock redemption for which family attribution
was waived).
170. Since Canada does not have an estate tax, only the determination of the income tax
liability is suspended until the funding of the marital bequest.
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after the death of the taxpayer. 171 Revenue Canada officials report the
system works without significant difficulty, although there has been
some dispute as to the meaning of "indefeasibly vested" under particu-
lar circumstances.
17 2
In short, the need to wait until the estate's assets have been dis-
tributed to determine the income tax and estate tax liabilities does not
seem to be an insuperable objection to allowing a marital exemption to
the gains tax. There is, however, another possible objection: a gains tax
with a marital exemption inappropriately gives the executor incentive
to transfer low basis assets to the surviving spouse and high basis assets
to other beneficiaries, in order to defer as much gains tax as possible.
This incentive could be considered inappropriate for two reasons.
First, of course, there is the revenue loss. Although the loss would not
be trivial, the tax avoided is deferred only until the death of the surviv-
ing spouse. Second, tax considerations might encourage funding of the
marital bequest with low basis assets, when some other method of fund-
ing the bequest would make better nontax sense. The 1969 Treasury
proposal took this second concern seriously enough to include a compli-
cated method of addressing it. 7 3 Under the proposal, if a decedent left
some but not all of his estate to his surviving spouse, his total basis in
all his assets was allocated among all his assets in accordance with their
relative fair market values. Thus, every asset would bear the same ratio
of appreciation to value, and funding a marital bequest at any given
dollar amount would result in a marital exemption not dependent on
the particular assets used to fund the bequest.
Reallocation would be tremendously complex in practice. The real-
located basis of every asset would depend on the basis and value of
every other asset. Uncertainty concerning either the basis or the value
of even one significant asset in the estate would create uncertainty as to
the gain or loss recognized on every nonmarital bequest asset and un-
certainty as to the basis of every marital bequest asset. Amended re-
turns and claims for refund-both income tax and estate tax-would
become the norm. The complexity and uncertainty would far exceed
that under a system with a marital exemption but without basis
reallocation.
171. Revenue Canada, upon written request, may extend the time period as it deems reason-
able. Income Tax Act, § 70(6) (1992). For deaths before 1985, the normal period for vesting was 15
months. IT-444R § 3(b) (1987).
172. The issue is addressed in IT-449R (1987).
173. Tax Reform Studies and Proposals at 338, 344-46 (cited in note 148). The proposal
justifies its basis reallocation rules solely on the grounds of not distorting the distribution of assets
among beneficiaries; it does not mention revenue concerns.
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Canada has chosen not to require basis reallocation. Apparently
Canadian executors have been able to balance the tax and nontax con-
siderations in deciding how to fund marital bequests.174 American exec-
utors should be equally capable of handling such situations. As for the
revenue loss from the deferral opportunities, it seems an inevitable part
of a workable gains tax at death with a marital exemption.
In sum, a tax on capital gains at death should include an exemp-
tion for gain in assets actually used to fund marital bequests, basis real-
location should not be used, and return dates and extensions should be
designed keeping in mind the time required to fund marital bequests
(or returns should be allowed to anticipate future funding).
2. How Should Charitable Bequests of Appreciated Property Be
Treated?
Under current law, a taxpayer who makes a charitable donation
during life of appreciated property generally may take an income tax
deduction for the fair market value of the property, despite not having
to recognize gain on the disposition.175 The rule permitting deductibility
of an amount never taken into income is inconsistent with general in-
come tax principles, but has survived as an incentive for charitable do-
nations.17 6 Under current law, a charitable bequest generates no income
tax deduction, but is deductible under the estate tax.1 7 If the property
bequeathed to charity is appreciated, the appreciation is not, of course,
subject to income tax.
If capital gains are to be taxed at death, the issue arises as to
whether gain should be taxed on property left to charity.1 s The resolu-
tion of this issue should be consistent with the treatment of lifetime
charitable gifts of appreciated property. If the gain is not taxed when
the property is donated by a living taxpayer, it also should not be taxed
when the donation is made at death. On the other hand, in those situa-
tions in which present law denies a charitable deduction for lifetime
donations of appreciation (the equivalent of allowing a deduction for
the appreciation, but at the tax cost of taking the appreciation into in-
174. If there is any question under applicable state law concerning the executor's discretion
to balance these tax and nontax considerations, the will might specifically confer such discretion.
175. Section 170(e) contains exceptions to the general rule of fair market value deductibility.
176. However, Section 57(a)(6) treats the charitable deduction of unrecognized appreciation
as an item of tax preference for purposes of the alternative minimum tax.
177. I.R.C. § 2055.
178. A charitable exemption is assumed by the Congressional Budget Office in Reducing the
Deficit at 315 (cited in note 14).
1993] 401
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
come)'7 9 the appreciation in a charitable bequest should be taxed at
death.
180
In those situations in which gain is not recognized on charitable
bequests, issues arise analogous to those created by a marital exemp-
tion: (a) the problem of what, if anything, should be done about the
incentive the charitable exemption gives the executor to satisfy the
charitable bequest with low basis assets, and (b) the administrative
problem of needing to wait and see what assets fund the charitable be-
quest (in the case of a nonspecific bequest) before the income tax and
estate tax liabilities can be determined.
The problem of selection of low basis assets might be viewed as
more serious in terms of revenue loss than the equivalent problem
under the marital exemption, because gain that escapes tax under the
charitable exemption is permanently forgiven, rather than merely de-
ferred. On the other hand, it is less serious in the sense that total chari-
table bequests are far smaller than total marital bequests. 181 The basic
point, however, is that Congress is willing to permit the revenue loss
caused by donor selection of low basis assets in the case of lifetime con-
tributions, and as long as that remains true there is no good reason for
policing basis selectivity by executors. The other concern about basis
selectivity in the marital exemption context (that it might lead to trans-
fers of inappropriate assets to the surviving spouse) has little relevance
to the charitable exemption. Whatever may be the appropriate level of
congressional solicitude for the needs of widows, presumably the appro-
priate level for charities is considerably lower. As for the problem of
having to wait and see how the charitable bequest is funded before cal-
culating the tax liabilities, any liberalization of the time to file rules (or
permission to file in anticipation of bequest funding) that is adequate
to deal with the equivalent problem under the marital exemption would
be adequate to deal with this problem.
If Congress concludes (contrary to the above analysis) that special
provisions are needed to limit selection of low basis assets for charitable
179. Actually, if the appreciation would be taxed at a low capital gains rate, and the deduc-
tion would be against income taxed at a high ordinary income rate, simply denying a deduction for
the appreciation is harsher to taxpayers than taxing the appreciation and then allowing the
deduction.
180. Assuming current law regarding lifetime charitable contributions remains unchanged,
this means that gain should be recognized on a bequest of ordinary income property, I.R.C. §
170(e)(1)(A), on a bequest of tangible personal property to a donee whose use of the property is
unrelated to its exempt purposes, I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(i), and on a bequest to a private founda-
tion, I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(ii). In addition, gain should be recognized at death for purposes of the
alternative minimum tax. I.R.C. § 57(a)(6).
181. Estate tax returns filed for 1986 decedents claimed marital deductions totaling $20.9
billion and charitable deductions totaling $4.1 billion. Barry Johnson, Estate Tax Returns, 1986-
1988, 9 SOI Bull. 27, 50 (Spring 1990).
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bequests, it nevertheless should avoid the complexities of basis realloca-
tion. Rather, it should adopt the much simpler approach suggested by
Professor Graetz.' 8 2 First, he would allow the deduction only for specific
bequests, eliminating both the problem of executor selectivity and the
need to wait and see how the bequest is funded. This would be simple
enough, but it seemingly has little point. It is not apparent, as a matter
of policy, why selectivity by the decedent should be permitted but se-
lectivity by the executor should not. And nothing of significance is
gained by eliminating the need to wait and see for charitable bequests,
as long as the need to wait and see for marital bequests remains.
The second Graetz suggestion is to require that charitable bequests
include, in cash or unappreciated property, the tax saved by the estate
by donating appreciated property to charity. The effect would be to re-
quire that the benefit of the exemption go to the charity, rather than to
the taxpayer. It is an interesting idea, but if it is appropriate for chari-
table bequests, it is equally appropriate for charitable contributions
during life.
In sum, the rules concerning exemption of gain on bequests to
charity should be consistent with the rules governing contributions dur-
ing life, and no special rules are needed to limit an executor's ability to
fund bequests with low basis assets.'
B. The Structural Relation of the Death Gains Tax
to the Estate Tax
1. Should the Death Gains Tax Be an Estate Tax Deduction?
If a taxpayer pays a capital gains tax during life, the tax paid de-
pletes his potential taxable estate. In order for a capital gains tax at
death to have an equivalent effect on estate tax liability, the capital
gains tax would have to be deductible in computing the taxable estate.
In fact, it would not even be necessary to amend the estate tax to
182. See Graetz, 59 Va. L. Rev. at 846-47 (cited in note 84).
183. Canada treats charitable contributions and bequests of appreciated property as trigger-
ing recognition of gain. A special rule permits a taxpayer making a contribution or bequest of
capital gain property to designate any amount between the basis of the property and its fair mar-
ket value as both the proceeds of disposition and the amount of the contribution. Income Tax Act
§ 118.1(6) (1992). When the gain will be taxed at a lower rate than the income against which the
contribution is deducted, a taxpayer will select the highest permissible basis. Unlike the U.S. Reve-
nue Code, Canadian law permits an income tax deduction for charitable bequests (whether or not
of appreciated property) to be taken in the taxation year of the taxpayer's death. Income Tax Act
§ 118.1(5). Whether such a deduction should be permitted is a question analytically unrelated to
the treatment of appreciation in donated property. Congress likely will continue to disallow an
income tax deduction for charitable bequests as long as there is an estate tax, but it probably
would consider allowing the deduction if the estate tax were eliminated.
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achieve that result, since Section 2053(a)(3) already provides a deduc-
tion for "claims against the estate," and the capital gains tax liability
would be such a claim.
When Congress was considering taxing capital gains at death dur-
ing the 1970s, however, a number of witnesses testified that any gains
tax should not be deductible, because allowing a deduction would have
a regressive effect.184 Suppose, for example, that two taxpayers die, each
owning $100,000 appreciation subject to a twenty-eight percent capital
gains tax. Decedent A's estate, which is the smaller of the two, is sub-
ject to a marginal estate tax rate of forty percent; B's estate is subject
to the highest marginal estate tax rate of fifty percent. Compared with
the result if the gains tax did not exist, the deductible gains tax in-
creases the total death tax burden on B's $100,000 appreciation from
fifty percent to sixty-four percent: the $28,000 income tax leaves
$72,000 subject to a $36,000 estate tax, with the result that the com-
bined tax liability is $64,000. Again compared with no gains tax, A's
total death tax burden is increased from forty percent to 56.8%: the
$28,000 income tax leaves $72,000 subject to a $28,800 estate tax, re-
sulting in a combined tax liability of $56,800. Thus the introduction of
the deductible gains tax can be called regressive, in that it increases the
effective combined tax rate on the smaller estate more than it increases
the rate on the larger estate. In order to avoid this effect, the American
Bankers Association proposed a nondeductible additional estate tax1 85
to be imposed on appreciation at death. The tax would be imposed at a
flat rate equal to the increase in effective combined rate that a deducti-
ble capital gains tax at the generally applicable capital gains rate would
impose on an estate in the highest bracket. Using the numbers in the
above example, this would result in a fourteen percent flat rate nonde-
ductible AET, applicable to both A's and B's estates. 86
184. See, for example, Estate and Gift Tax Hearings at 120-22 (cited in note 153) (statement
of American Bankers Association). To state the obvious, this issue does not arise if there is no
estate tax. Thus Canada, which repealed the estate tax at the same time it enacted the capital
gains tax, did not have to consider this question.
185. Id. at 129. Since the tax base for the AET is determined using income tax concepts, the
name Additional Estate Tax is a misnomer. The American Bankers Association made the improb-
able suggestion that labeling the tax an estate tax would put it on firmer constitutional footing
than if it were considered to be an income tax. Id. at 130. For a brief explanation of the constitu-
tional issue, see note 25.
186. The proposed AET, unlike most proposals to tax capital gains at death, provided for no
marital exemption. The marital exemption question is, however, entirely separate from the estate
tax deductibility question. (The marital exemption issue is discussed in text accompanying notes
150-74.) There could be a nondeductible AET with a marital exemption, or a deductible gains tax
without a marital exemption. The issue with respect to the marital exemption is complexity; the
issue with respect to estate tax deductibility is alleged regressivity. Estate tax nondeductibility is
not a significant simplification per se.
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The argument that a deductible gains tax is regressive is funda-
mentally misguided. The supposed regressivity is caused by the fact
that any given dollar amount of deduction always will reduce the tax
liability of a higher bracket taxpayer more than it will reduce the liabil-
ity of a lower bracket taxpayer. If an estate-tax deductible gains tax is
considered unacceptably regressive for this reason, then the income tax
deduction for business expenses and the estate tax deductions for ex-
penses, indebtedness, and taxes would be unacceptable as well. Also un-
acceptable would be the fact that the reduction in estate tax liability
caused by any given amount of capital gains tax paid during life is
greater for a high bracket estate than for a low bracket estate. For that
matter, the failure to tax income never earned and the failure to tax
wealth never transferred would be objectionable because those failures
are more valuable the higher one's tax bracket.
The regressivity analysis that resulted in the AET proposal reflects
a misunderstanding of Stanley Surrey's argument that tax expenditures
in the form of deductions are unwarranted "upside-down subsidies,"
because for any given dollar amount of deduction such tax expenditures
give the largest subsidy to the wealthiest (highest bracket) taxpayer. 187
That criticism applies, however, only when the deduction functions as a
subsidy. When the deduction is not a subsidy, but rather an integral
part of the logical structure of the tax base, the criticism makes no
sense.188 The estate tax deductibility of gains tax liability is a basic part
of the structure of the estate tax base: the tax base is wealth gratui-
There is one way, however, in which the estate tax deductibility and marital exemption issues
may be related significantly- a nondeductible AET might result in a tax rate low enough to make
the imposition of the tax on marital bequests politically feasible, thus simplifying the administra-
tion of the tax considerably. If, however, one considers both estate tax nondeductibility and the
taxation of marital bequests bad policy decisions, this would be a very high price to pay for ease of
administration.
In any event, the justification for applying an AET rate lower than the capital gains rate-as
compensation for the nondeductibility of the AET against the estate tax-would not apply in the
case of a marital bequest not subject to estate tax. Suppose, for example, a surviving spouse (SS)
receives property with a basis of zero and a value of $100, and the property is subject to a 14%
AET and no estate tax. SS sells $14 of the property to pay the tax (the sale generates no tax,
because basis was increased to $100 after imposition of the AET) and dies owning the rest of the
property, which is still worth $86. The 50% estate tax on the property at SS's death is $43. The
total tax burden on the property is thus only 57%, despite the fact that the combined AET/estate
tax burden on top bracket taxpayers is ordinarily 64% (14% AET plus 50% estate tax). What has
happened, of course, is that the SS received the equivalent of an estate tax deduction for the AET
by paying the AET. This occurred despite the fact that the lower rate of the AET was supposed to
be compensation for the estate tax nondeductibility of the AET.
187. Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform 134-38 (Harvard, 1973).
188. In addition to its major flaw of being premised on a misunderstanding, the AET also is
subject to the criticism that for many taxpayers (those who anticipate having estates not subject to
the highest marginal rate) it will be less burdensome than a capital gains tax during their lifetime,
thus continuing the lock-in effect.
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tously transferred at death, and wealth that must be used to pay taxes
cannot be so transferred.
189
If the combined effect of a deductible gains tax at death and the
estate tax strikes Congress as insufficiently progressive (a rather un-
likely event), the obvious solution is to build greater progressivity into
the estate tax rates, the capital gains rates, or both-not illogically to
deny an estate tax deduction for the capital gains tax.'
2. The Estate Tax Basis Credit Proposal
A study paper accompanying the Report by the American Bar As-
sociation Tax Section on Transfer Tax Restructuring explains an inter-
esting proposal for dealing with the treatment of unrealized
appreciation at death."' The proposal is in the context of a proposed
fifty percent flat rate estate tax,192 which eliminates the substantive dif-
ference between a twenty-eight percent deductible gains tax and a four-
teen percent nondeductible AET (assuming neither tax applies to
estates not subject to the estate tax). The study paper, however, goes
beyond this equivalency, to note that there is also an equivalency be-
tween a nondeductible AET on appreciation and an estate tax with a
credit for basis.' For example, consider (a) a fifty percent estate tax
and a fourteen percent AET, and (b) a sixty-four percent estate tax and
fourteen percent credit against the estate tax for the value included in
the estate that does not constitute unrealized appreciation. Under ei-
ther system, the effect is that appreciation included in the estate is
taxed at sixty-four percent, and other value included in the estate is
taxed at fifty percent.
189. For the same reason, the exclusion from the tax base of capital gains taxes paid during
life is entirely appropriate and cannot sensibly be called regressive. The same is true, of course, of
the Section 162 income tax business expense deduction and the Section 2053 estate tax deduction
for claims and expenses.
190. Note, however, that the issue is of limited relevance under the current compressed es-
tate tax rate structure. A 28% gains tax increases the tax burden on a 50% bracket estate by 14%
(from 50% to 64%), and on a 37% bracket estate (the lowest bracket not entirely sheltered by the
unified credit) by 19.64% (from 37% to 56.64%). The difference between the 19.64% increase and
the 14% increase the 37% bracket estate would experience under an AET is not overwhelming.
And the difference would disappear entirely, of course, under a flat rate estate tax.
On the other hand, the difference between a 14% AET and a 28% capital gains tax would be
very significant to an estate subject to the appreciation tax but too small to be subject to the estate
tax. The crucial issue concerning such estates, however, is whether it is appropriate to subject
them to any form of death gains tax. On that question, see text accompanying notes 215-19.
191. A.B.A. Section of Taxation, Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 Tax Law. 395,
446-48 (Winter 1988). The study paper includes a note that it "reflects various individual views,
but does not reflect the position of the task force or a majority of its members." Id. at 446.
192. Id. at 397, 446.
193. Id. at 446.
[Vol. 46:361
TAXING GAINS
Having noted this equivalency, the study paper proposes using a
credit system, rather than an AET system. A minor objection to the
credit system is that it is somewhat more confusing and less straightfor-
ward than an additional tax on appreciation. Much more important,
however, is the way in which the study paper uses the credit proposal as
a disguised way of reducing death tax rates. The study paper proposes
not a sixty-four percent estate tax and a fourteen percent credit, but
rather a fifty percent estate tax and a ten percent credit. Thus, the pro-
posal disingenously leaves unchanged the present treatment of unreal-
ized appreciation at death, and reduces the tax on other value passing
at death. It is quite a sleight of hand: to claim to be taxing unrealized
appreciation at death, while actually reducing overall death tax reve-
nues. This tax reduction effect is not, of course, inherent in the credit
proposal, as the possibility of a sixty-four percent estate tax with a
fourteen percent credit indicates.
The other interesting aspect of the proposal is how it deals with the
problem of marital bequests. Unlike the AET, it in effect exempts ap-
preciation in marital bequests from tax." The mechanism for the mari-
tal exemption is very simple: the estate tax rate before credit (e.g.,
sixty-four percent) in effect incorporates both the true estate tax rate
(e.g., fifty percent) and the hidden appreciation tax rate (e.g., fourteen
percent). When the marital bequest is exempted from the estate tax by
the estate tax marital deduction, 195 it thus is exempted automatically
from the appreciation tax as well.
The proposal avoids the need to "wait and see" what assets are
used to fund the marital bequest in order to compute the appreciation
tax, and gives the executor no incentive to fund the marital bequest
with low basis assets. It computes the credit as a percentage (e.g., four-
teen percent) of "X", where X/taxable estate = nonappreciation por-
tion of gross estate/gross estate. 9 6 Although this formula depends in
part on the value of the marital bequest (because that value affects the
amount of the taxable estate), it does not depend in any way on the
basis of the assets used to fund the marital bequest. In effect, it conclu-
sively presumes that the assets used to fund the marital bequest have
the same basis to value ratio as the gross estate as a whole. That as-
sumption is the equivalent of the 1969 Treasury proposal to require re-
allocation of basis in computing the marital exemption, in terms of its
effect on the amount of appreciation taxed at death. 9" As with realloca-
194. This is not, however, an inherent difference between the credit and AET approaches; as
noted above, an AET could be designed with a marital exemption. See note 186.
195. I.R.C. § 2056.
196. A.B.A. Section of Taxation at 446 (cited in note 191).
197. See text accompanying note 173.
1993]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tion of basis, it involves the complication that the amount of gain taxed
(or the amount of gain effectively not taxed by reason of the credit)
depends on the value and basis of every asset in the gross estate. A
change on audit of the value or basis of any asset would change the
amount of the credit.
The proposal provides that the basis of appreciated property in the
gross estate would be increased (from the decedent's basis)1 9 by the
amount of "X", with the increase allocated among appreciated assets in
proportion to their relative amounts of appreciation. 9 There appears
to be a technical mistake in the proposal. The logical result would be to
permit a basis increase for the appreciation in the taxable estate subject
to tax (by virtue of not being eligible for the credit). Such appreciation
is represented not by "X", but by taxable estate minus "X". Presuma-
bly this is what the study paper intended.
Assuming that was the intent, is the basis proposal attractive? No-
tice that the effect is an odd combination of basis reallocation and basis
tracing: for purposes of determining the amount of gain recognized (i.e.,
the amount of the taxable estate not eligible for the credit) the proposal
uses reallocation, but for purposes of determining subsequent basis of
the assets the proposal uses the actual basis of each asset plus an ad-
justment. This combination produces unappealing results. The pro rata
allocation of the available basis increase means that the post-death ba-
sis of every appreciated asset included in the estate depends on the ba-
sis and value of every other asset. If there is a marital bequest, no
appreciated asset will receive a fair market value basis in the hands of a
beneficiary of the estate 00 (nor will any appreciated asset receive a pure
carryover basis). This is more complex than the 1969 Treasury proposal
for reallocating basis, which would have simply given a fair market
value basis to nonmarital property following the application of the
gains tax at death.201 In addition, the study paper proposal has the ar-
guably unfair result of giving a basis increase to appreciated marital
bequest property, even though the appreciation in the property was not
taxed.202
198. Actually, the proposal is not explicit as to whether the increase would be from the dece-
dent's basis or from fair market value at death, Section 1014 basis, but it must mean decedent's
basis, since there could be no valid reason for increasing basis above fair market value at death.
199. Tax Reform Studies and Proposals at 448 (cited in note 148).
200. In fact, this problem exists even if there is no marital bequest, because the proposal also
disallows a basis increase for appreciation deemed not subject to tax by reason of the basic estate
tax exemption ($600,000) and the deduction for debts and charges against the estate.
201. Tax Reform Studies and Proposals at 345 (cited in note 148). The Treasury proposal
would have provided for no step up in the reallocated basis of marital bequest property. Id.
202. Another objection to the proposal is that if the appreciation tax is built into the estate
tax, there never will be any appreciation tax if there is no estate tax, and that means there is no
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To sum up, (a) a basis credit has no substantive advantage over
AET, is harder to understand, and could be used to disguise a tax de-
crease; and (b) the study paper's treatment of marital bequests involves
a strange combination of reallocated basis and actual basis, less attrac-
tive than either standing alone.
C. Special Avoidance Concerns
1. Taxation of Gain on Gifts During Life
Most plans to tax capital gains at death have included taxation of
gains on gifts made during life. 03 The reason is apparent: the premise
of the tax at death is that gains should be taxed at least once a genera-
tion, but gains tax can be deferred indefinitely if appreciated property
is transferred from one generation to another by gift and gain is not
taxed at that time. A rule taxing gain on assets gifted in contemplation
of death, or within a specified time before death, is not adequate to
prevent avoidance because many wealthy taxpayers will be willing and
able to transfer much of their appreciation well before their deaths.0 4
Such avoidance will be most practical for the very wealthy, thus reduc-
ing the vertical equity of the death gains tax.
It is clear, then, that gifts generally should trigger the recognition
of gain (subject perhaps to some unified exemption amount 0 5 and a
limited exemption for nonbusiness tangible personal property). The
major complication concerns incomplete lifetime transfers: transfers
(typically, but not necessarily, in trust) in which the donor retains some
control over or interest in the transferred property. Under what circum-
stances should an incomplete transfer be deemed sufficient to impose
an immediate gains tax, and under what circumstances should the tax
be postponed until the retained interest or control is terminated (which
may be during life or at death)? The problem is not that current law
limit to the amount of appreciation that may escape tax in the case of debt-laden estates. This
point is discussed in text accompanying notes 235-36.
203. See, for example, Tax Reform Studies and Proposals at 348; President's 1963 Tax Mes-
sage at 24 (cited in note 25); Income Tax Act § 69(1)(b) (1991) (Canada).
204. The AET proposal would have continued current law-no recognition of gain and carry-
over basis-for all lifetime gifts other than those made within two years of death. Estate and Gift
Tax Hearings at 104 (cited in note 153). This opportunity for unlimited deferral of gain across
generations is a major weakness in the AET. It also is inherent in the concept of an AET. The
AET is imposed at a relatively low rate because it is not deductible against the estate tax, but any
gains tax imposed during life automatically functions as the equivalent of an estate tax deduction
(by reducing the size of the potential estate). Thus, a gains tax on gifts, designed to complement
an AET, would have to be imposed at a highef rate than the ART.
205. Designing a unified exemption for gains tax on gratuitous transfers during life or at
death involves certain difficulties, which are discussed in text accompanying notes 234-37.
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provides no help in designing rules to deal with this issue; rather cur-
rent law provides too much help. There is one set of rules for determin-
ing whether a grantor will continue to be taxed on the income from
incompletely transferred property,06 a different set of rules for deter-
mining whether a gift is complete for gift tax purposes, 07 and a third
set of rules for determining whether incompletely transferred property
is includable in a decedent's gross estate.08
Without delving into the intricacies of the different rules, does it
inherently make more sense to apply the rules from one tax than from
another? One commentator has stated, without explaining his reason-
ing, that the income tax grantor trust rules should be used.209 The idea
that existing income tax rules concerning the ownership of property
should be used in the context of a new income tax problem certainly
has intuitive appeal. As a practical matter, however, it is more impor-
tant to coordinate the new gains taxes with the transfer taxes. Planning
for these taxes will be a part of estate planning, where the gift and
estate tax incomplete transfer rules govern. And using the transfer tax
rules will mean that the new gains taxes will never impose a new valua-
tion requirement-gains tax will be imposed only when valuation al-
ready is required by the transfer tax rules.
In some cases, a transfer is considered complete for gift tax pur-
poses but incomplete for estate tax purposes, so that a transfer tax is
imposed both upon the initial transfer and at the transferor's death.2 10
In such a case, both the initial transfer and the death would trigger a
capital gains tax. This would not involve double taxation, because the
basis of the property would be increased by the amount of gain taxed at
the time of the initial transfer.
2. Generation-Skipping Transfers
But for the generation-skipping transfer tax, a taxpayer could
avoid one level of transfer tax by transferring (during life or at death)
property to a trust, giving his child a substantial interest in the prop-
206. LR.C. §§ 671-79.
207. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2.
208. The most important of those provisions are Sections 2036, 2037, and 2038.
209. Victor Thuronyi, Tax Reform for 1989 and Beyond, 42 Tax Notes 981, 989-90 (1989).
210. The classic example is a transfer of property to a trust, with the transferor retaining an
income interest for life. The value of the remainder is subject to gift tax, Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-
2(b), and the entire value of the property is subject to the estate tax, I.R.C. § 2036.
There is considerable dissatisfaction with the inconsistencies between the gift and estate tax
rules concerning incomplete transfers, and proposals have been made to apply a single set of rules
to both taxes. See, for example, The President's Tax Proposals to Congress at 378-80 (cited in




erty during the child's life (such as an income interest for life), with the
remainder to his grandchild at the child's death. The property would
not be subject to estate tax at the child's death, despite the fact that
the child received the income from the property for as long as he
lived.211 Under current law, however, a generation-skipping transfer tax
generally will be imposed at the child's death, to compensate for the
avoided estate tax.'
The same kind of generation-skipping trust also could be used to
frustrate the congressional intent to impose a tax on unrealized appreci-
ation once every generation.2 13 To prevent this avoidance, rules are
needed that will treat the termination of interests such as the child's
income interests for life as events triggering the gains tax. For the most
part, the rules in Chapter 13 of the Revenue Code defining a genera-
tion-skipping transfer also should be used for purposes of the gains tax.
In the interest of simplicity, the gains tax also should follow the genera-
tion-skipping transfer tax in not attempting to base the rate of tax on
the financial circumstances of the skip person (e.g., the child). 4 When
the tax is triggered, it should be imposed at the top capital gains rate
(or ordinary income rate, if it is ordinary income), rather than at the
rate it would be subject to if included in the income of the skip person.
There are, however, two important issues concerning the scope of
the gains tax: whether the tax should apply to direct skips and whether
there should be a gains tax exemption for transfers under some speci-
fied dollar amount.
Under the terminology of the generation-skipping transfer tax, a
direct skip (as contrasted with a taxable distribution or a taxable termi-
nation) is a generation-skipping transfer in which the skipped genera-
tion is completely skipped-for example, an outright gift or bequest to
a grandchild, with the skipped child never receiving an interest of any
kind in the property. 5 Such a gift or bequest is, of course, already a
taxable event under a capital gains tax on gratuitous transfers. The
question is whether something more than the normal tax should be im-
posed, because a direct skip may result in an unusually long deferral
period until the next capital gains tax is imposed on the property. For
211. Section 2036(a) includes in the gross estate property in which the decedent had a life
estate, only if the decedent originally had owned the property outright and then transferred it
retaining a life estate.
212. The tax is imposed by Chapter 13, Sections 2601-63. The text states that the tax "gen-
erally" will be imposed, because Section 2631 grants every individual transferor a $1,000,000 ex-
emption from the tax.
213. This was not an issue under Section 1023, because unlimited deferral of gain across
generations was consistent with a carryover basis regime.
214. I.R.C. § 2641.
215. Id. § 2612.
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example, a bequest to a twenty-five-year-old grandchild instead of a
fifty-year-old child increases the potential deferral period, assuming the
property is held until death, by twenty-five years.
What is the magnitude of the benefit of this deferral? Suppose the
property bequeathed to the twenty-five-year-old grandchild is currently
worth $100. Since what is being deferred is a tax on future apprecia-
tion, a forecast is needed of how much appreciation there will be. As-
suming the property appreciates at a compound annual rate of four
percent, in twenty-five years it will be worth $267. A gains tax of
twenty-eight percent imposed at that time (on the death of the child)
would be $46.76, and would have a present value (discounted at four
percent) of $17.54. If, however, that tax is deferred until the death of
the grandchild in fifty years, the present value of the tax is only $6.59.
Under these assumptions, the present value of deferring the next gain
recognition for fifty years instead of only twenty-five years is $17.54 -
$6.59 - $10.95, or about eleven percent of the value of the transferred
asset.
The tax benefit from the generation-skipping transfer is sufficiently
small, and sufficiently conjectural, that the best legislative response
probably is to do nothing-not to impose any gains tax other than the
basic tax at the time of the original transfer. If, however, Congress dis-
agrees and decides to impose a special tax on direct skips, the best ap-
proach would be to impose an additional tax at the time of the original
transfer. Any "wait and see" alternative, such as taxing the apprecia-
tion in the property if it is still owned by grandchild at child's death,
would be too difficult to administer.
Using the assumptions in the above example, the appropriate
amount of the additional tax would be $17.54-the present value of the
tax that would be due in twenty-five years, upon child's death, had
child not been skipped. When gain on the property eventually is recog-
nized, appropriate allowance should be made for the additional tax
paid. There are various ways of making that allowance. For example, if
gain is recognized within the next twenty-five years, the taxpayer could
be allowed a credit against the gains tax of $17.54 plus interest; if the
property is disposed of after twenty-five years, the basis could be
stepped up to $267. The gains tax avoidance potential of direct skips,
however, does not seem sufficient to justify this complexity.
The generation-skipping transfer tax allows every individual to
make generation-skipping transfers of up to $1,000,000 free of the tax,
and to choose how to allocate that exemption among his transfers.2 16
This exemption is based on the value of the property at the time of the
216. Id. § 2641.
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original transfer. If an original transfer of $1,000,000 is exempted, and
the property appreciates to $4,000,000 (for example) by the time the
taxable distribution or taxable termination occurs, the entire $4,000,000
is exempt.21 7 It would be possible to apply the same rule for purposes of
the gains tax, thus exempting the $3,000,000 gain in the example. Alter-
natively, the same exemption mechanism could be used, but the
amount of the exemption could be smaller.218 An exemption might be
justified on the following reasoning: that in theory any unused portion
of the skip person's own minimum basis (or other form of gains tax
exemption) should be available, but that coordinating the generation-
skipping gains tax with the skip person's actual tax circumstances is too
complicated, so a special gains tax exemption should be allowed in-
stead. The problem with this argument is that, in a family with enough
wealth to merit the sophisticated planning involved in generation-skip-
ping trusts, the skip person is likely to have little or no unused gains
tax exemption. At most, a special generation-skipping gains tax exemp-
tion should be relatively small-certainly no more than $100,000-and
a tax with no exemption would be entirely justifiable.19
3. Estate Freezes
Since both the estate tax and the capital gains tax at death depend
on asset values as of the decedent's death, a death gains tax creates the
same incentive for "freezing" the value of assets the taxpayer expects to
hold until death, which always has existed under the estate tax. This
typically is attempted when an elderly person divides his interest in an
enterprise into a senior interest and a junior interest. He then gives
away the junior interest, which is entitled to most or all of the potential
growth in the enterprise, while retaining the senior interest (whose
value is more or less frozen because of its limited or nonexistent inter-
est in growth). The history of the attempts of Congress and the IRS to
deal with estate freezing is not a happy one.220 It may be, however, that
217. Id. § 2642.
218. It is crucial, however, to the administration of any such exemption that the exemption
be based on and allocated among the value of the original transfers, rather than the appreciation
at the time the generation-skipping events occur.
219. Canada has a generation-skipping gains tax provision that provides for a deemed dispo-
sition of trust property every 21 years, rather than focusing on taxable distributions and termina-
tions. Income Tax Act § 104(4) (1992). This would be an acceptable alternative to the system of
Chapter 13, but given that Chapter 13 is already in place and familiar to American practitioners
and taxpayers, it would be better to model the generation-skipping gains tax provision on the
Chapter 13 approach.
220. Saddest of all was Section 2036(c), which was enacted in 1987, Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1987, § 10402, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 100 Stat. 1330, 1330-1431, and repealed retro-
actively (in response to intense criticism) in Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, § 11601,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-1490.
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the most recent legislative effort-the Chapter 14 special valuation
rules,221 enacted in 1990-will bring order to this troubled area. The
basic approach of Chapter 14 is to require the use of valuation rules
that assign to a gifted junior interest substantial value, relative to the
retained senior interest, thus assuring that the implementation of the
freeze will result in a substantial taxable gift.
In keeping with the general principle of using the same valuations
for transfer tax and for gains tax, and in recognition of the identity of
the estate freeze issues under both tax systems, whatever estate freeze
rules finally are settled on for gift and estate tax purposes can and
should be used to value assets subject to the gains tax at gift or
death.222 The gains tax, however, does involve an issue not present
under the transfer taxes: the gains tax requires an allocation not only of
value between transferred and retained interests, but also of basis. The
law should provide that basis is allocated between the interests in the
same proportions as value. Otherwise taxpayers would attempt to make
unrealistically high allocations of basis to transferred interests, result-
ing in deferral of tax until a later transfer of the low basis retained
interest.
D. A Small Estate Exemption
It seems clear that there should be an exemption from a capital
gains death tax for small estates. At some point, estates are small
enough that the revenue gained from taxing their appreciation does not
justify imposing the complexities of a capital gains tax (or, for that
matter, of carryover basis). The difficult question is finding that point.
One obvious and attractive possibility is designing the exemption to
track (so far as possible) the estate tax exemption provided by the uni-
fied credit, so that estates not subject to the estate tax also would not
be subject to the gains tax, and estates subject to the estate tax also
would be subject to the gains tax. 2 3 For estates not subject to the gains
tax, current law-no realization of gain or loss at death, and fair market
value basis for inherited property-would continue to apply. This
221. I.R.C. §§ 2701-04, enacted by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 § 11602,
104 Stat. at 1388-491-500.
222. Even if the transfer taxes are repealed, if a statutory approach to estate freezes has
proven satisfactory under the transfer taxes, it should be retained to deal with the same problem
under the gains tax. None of the previous proposals for a capital gains tax at death has included
anti-estate freeze provisions; but at the time of those proposals, the transfer taxes themselves also
lacked explicit rules for estate freezes.
223. However, this is not the approach assumed by the Congressional Budget Office in Re-
ducing the Deficit at 315-16 (cited in note 14). That approach would allow a general exclusion of
only $75,000 gain. (The Congressional Budget Office's alternative of a 10% supplemental estate tax
on appreciation, of course, would equate the estate tax and gain tax exemptions.)
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would limit the application of the death gains tax to a small portion of
the decedent population.224
Would it be appropriate to equate the estate tax and death gains
tax exemptions? In considering this question, the current $600,000 ex-
emption amount need not be viewed as unalterable. One may favor a
higher or lower estate tax exemption amount, quite apart from consid-
erations related to a new death gains tax. Or the revenue gained from
the death gains tax could be used to raise the exemption amount for
both taxes. Whatever the precise exemption amount, there are strong
arguments for using the same amount for both taxes. Perhaps most im-
portant, equating the exemptions would mean that the death tax would
not impose any additional valuation requirements: death gains tax
would be imposed only on property that already had to be valued for
the estate tax. Estates large enough to exceed the exemption amount
should have the necessary resources to handle the administrative bur-
dens of the gains tax. And despite affecting only a small percentage of
all estates, the tax still would reach much of the appreciation passing at
death, since that appreciation is concentrated in larger estates.22 5 Fi-
nally, equating the exemptions may be the only way to make the death
gains tax politically feasible. The 1976 carryover basis statute was
strongly criticized for applying to many estates not subject to the estate
tax,22 and the proponents of carryover basis agreed that the law should
be revised to equate the exemption levels.22 '
There are also arguments against equating the exemptions, all of
which are based on the fact that a gains tax exemption tied to the es-
tate tax exemption will mean huge amounts of appreciation escaping
the tax. Most obviously, the revenue lost by not taxing that apprecia-
tion would be in the billions of dollars. In addition, exempting the vast
majority of the population from the tax invites the argument that the
224. An estimated 45,800 U.S. citizens who died in 1986 had gross estates over $500,000 (the
exemption amount for that year). They represented about 2.2% of all U.S. decedents. Slightly
fewer than half (about 22,000) of those estates were taxable, after deductions. Johnson, 9 SOI Bull.
at 27 (cited in note 181).
225. .The leading carryover basis clean-up proposal would have equated the carryover basis
exemption with the existing estate tax exemption, by providing an exemption from carryover basis
for estates having $175,000 or less of carryover basis property. H.R. 4694 § 2(a) (proposed §
1023(a)(3)). Raising the minimum basis from $60,000 to $175,000 was estimated to reduce the
number of estates subject to carryover basis (from 9.4% of all decedents to 2.7%) much more than
it reduced the revenue effect of carryover basis (from $833 million to $560 million). Background
and Issues at 35 (cited in note 30).
226. Section 1023(d) provided a minimum basis of $60,000, but the estate tax exemption
amount at that time (computed by applying the $47,000 unified credit of Section 2010 to the rate
schedule of Section 2001(c)) was $175,625.
227. H.R. 4694 § 2(a) (proposed § 1023(a)(3)).
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tax is really just another excuse to soak the rich.2  It is also arguable
that a high exemption may do little to alleviate record keeping burdens
for middle class taxpayers, because one cannot be certain that one's es-
tate will be under the exemption level until one is dead. Finally, to the
extent taxpayers anticipate their estates will be eligible for the exemp-
tion, their assets will continue to be subject to lock-in.
I find the arguments for equating the estate and death tax exemp-
tions persuasive, and I suspect Congress would as well. Assuming that is
to be done, the next question is what mechanical form of exemption
would best achieve that goal. There are three basic forms an exemption
might take: a minimum basis exemption, an exemption based on the
amount of gain, and an exemption based on value.
To understand the mechanics of the three alternatives, imagine an
estate with a single asset valued at $800,000, with a basis of $200,000.
The minimum basis approach (which was used in carryover basis)
would give every estate a total basis229 of at least some stated minimum
amount. If the estate's actual total basis is greater than the minimum
basis, actual basis is used. If actual basis is less than minimum basis,
basis is increased by the difference between the two amounts. 30 Assum-
ing that the estate tax exemption is $600,000, and no estate of less than
that amount is subject to the death gains tax, the minimum basis allow-
ance must be $600,000. Thus, the basis of the estate's asset is increased
from $200,000 to $600,000, and the gain subject to tax at death is only
$200,000. As the example illustrates, the minimum basis sometimes will
benefit estates large enough to be subject to estate tax, but that is nec-
essary in order to avoid an inappropriate "cliff effect" (i.e., a situation
in which a trivial difference in economic circumstances makes a major
difference in tax consequences). Imagine two estates, each with a single
228. The response, of course, is that it makes good sense for the government to tax the ap-
preciation of only the wealthy for the same reason it made good sense for Willie Sutton to rob only
banks-that is where the money is. Nevertheless, the assertion that a high exemption was unfair to
the rich was prominent in the arguments of those who wanted carryover basis repealed, rather
than cleaned up. For example, Senator Bentsen remarked:
I look on this [the proposed increase in the minimum basis] as a political move to try to
gain support. If there is inequity for one, there is inequity for the other. If it is a complex
thing for the small estate, it is also a complex thing for the very large estate and we ought to
try to get some uniform application.
Estate and Gift Tax Carryover Basis and Generation-Skipping at 12 (cited in note 94).
The argument that a high exemption was unfair was somewhat ironic, coming largely from the
same people who had argued that a low exemption imposed an unreasonable burden on small
estates.
229. For purposes of computing gain, but not for the purpose of artificially creating a deduct-
ible loss.
230. This basis calculation is subject to the limitation that no asset's basis shall be increased
above its estate tax value.
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zero-basis asset, one valued at $600,000 and the other valued at
$600,001. If the first estate were entitled to the $600,000 minimum basis
and the second were entitled to none, the cliff effect would be dramatic
and grossly unfair. The other two approaches also provide benefits to
estates larger than $600,000 for the same reason.
What if the value of the asset were only $500,000? Then the mini-
mum basis rule would increase the asset's basis by $300,000, to
$500,000, and it would not be subject to gains tax. The same result
could be achieved more easily, by providing that estates whose assets
are valued at less than $600,000 simply are not subject to the gains
death tax, but rather continue to be governed by Section 1014 and the
nonrecognition of gains at death.23 '
On the same facts-an $800,000 asset with $200,000 basis-the
gains exemption approach would exempt the entire $600,000 gain from
tax. The gains exemption approach is used in the Canadian gains tax
232
and was used in the former British tax on gains at death.23 Like a min-
imum basis exemption, a gains exemption could provide that Section
1014 and nonrecognition would continue to apply to estates no larger
than $600,000.
A value-based exemption would provide that $600,000 of value
could pass at death, exempt from the death gains tax. Applying a value-
based exemption to the same facts, $600,000 of value (with an allocated
basis of $150,000) would be exempt from tax; $200,000 of value (with an
allocated basis of $50,000) would generate a taxable capital gain of
$150,000.
One way of comparing the effects of the three methods is to note
that each starts with a potential maximum benefit of $600,000 of "free"
basis or exempted gain. Minimum basis reduces that potential benefit
by the basis of all assets in the estate; a gains exemption does not re-
duce the benefit (except in the sense that it is limited by the amount of
the appreciation in the estate); and a value exemption reduces the ben-
efit by the basis of the assets passing under the exemption.
231. This was the approach taken by the leading carryover basis clean-up proposal. H.R.
4694 § 2(a) (proposed § 1023(a)(3)). This approach is discussed in more detail at text accompany-
ing notes 238-41.
232. Income Tax Act § 110.6 (1992). The general rule is a $100,000 unified exemption for
capital gain, regardless of whether the gain is realized by sale, gift, or bequest. This is increased to
$500,000 for gain on the transfer of farms and small businesses.
233. Graetz, 59 Va. L. Rev. at 842 (cited in note 84).
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1. The Exemption Methods Evaluated
a. Minimum Basis
Perhaps the most attractive feature of the minimum basis method
is that it tends to phase out its benefit for wealthy estates, which do not
need an exemption designed to simplify the rules for small estates, and
it accomplishes that phase-out without any cliff effect. The phase-out
follows naturally from the fact that the minimum basis rule confers no
benefit on estates with at least $60.0,000 actual basis, and the larger the
estate the more likely it will have at least that much actual basis.
Assuming the gains tax allows a marital exemption, the minimum
basis method coordinates easily with the estate tax marital deduction:
the $600,000 minimum basis is allowed with respect to the estate's as-
sets other than those passing to the surviving spouse (or to charity).
This coordination fails if there is no marital exemption from the gains
tax, but that problem is not peculiar to the minimum basis method:
allowing an estate tax marital deduction but not allowing a gains tax
marital exemption necessarily rejects the idea that the gains tax should
be designed not to apply when the estate tax does not apply.
At first glance, it appears that one disadvantage of the minimum
basis method is that it does not coordinate well with the application of
the transfer tax unified credit to gifts during life. In order to insure that
no gains tax is imposed on a gift sheltered from gift tax by the unified
credit, the minimum basis exemption would have to be uni-
fied-available for use on gifts as well as bequests. But allowing any
minimum basis for gifts, at a time when the total actual basis of gifts
and bequests is unknowable, creates the possibility of allowing an inap-
propriate basis increase under the minimum basis rules. The increase
may be inappropriate because the total actual basis of all gifts and be-
quests ultimately may exceed the minimum basis amount. There is,
however, a simple solution to this problem: allow the minimum basis
adjustment for gifts, but reduce the basis of assets transferred at death
to the extent that the previously allowed deduction was excessive,
viewed with the benefit of hindsight. For example, a gift of an asset
with a basis of $100,000 and a value of $500,000 results in an increase in
basis of $400,000 under the minimum basis rule. Suppose that this is
the taxpayer's only gift, and his estate consists of assets with a value of
$700,000 and a basis of $450,000. With hindsight, he had actual total
basis of $550,000, so he should have been permitted a basis increase of
only $50,000. The $350,000 excess portion of the basis increase allowed
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on the gift would be "recaptured" by decreasing the basis of the estate's
assets by $350,000, to $100,000.234
There is a situation in which minimum basis will not completely
exempt an estate from gains tax, despite the fact that the estate is not
subject to estate tax: when the estate's assets are appreciated, and their
value exceeds $600,000, but there is no estate tax because indebted-
ness 23 5 reduces the taxable estate to less than $600,000. Suppose, for
example, the estate's only asset has a value of $800,000, a basis of zero,
and is subject to a $300,000 debt.23 After application of the minimum
basis rule, the gains tax will apply to $200,000 of gain, even though
there is no estate tax liability. This results in less than perfect coordi-
nation of the gains tax with the estate tax, but any solution would be
worse than the problem. Complete coordination of the gains tax exemp-
tion with absence of estate tax liability is possible (as this example
demonstrates) only at the cost of giving some estates "free basis" of
more than the intended minimum basis amount. In fact, a rule that the
gains tax never applies if the net value of the estate is less than
$600,000 would mean no ceiling would exist at all on the potential
amount of gain that could be exempted.
b. Gain Exemption
The most important difference between the minimum basis method
and the gain exemption method is that the gain exemption method does
not tend to phase out its benefits for larger estates. In fact, since larger
estates will tend to have more gain than smaller estates, larger estates
generally will receive the greatest benefit from the gain exemption
method. Given the primary purpose of any exemption-to give small
estates relief from the burdens of a death gains tax-this is an ironic
result. I therefore prefer the minimum basis method.
The application of a gains exemption to gifts, however, does not
require the recapture rules necessitated by minimum basis. The first
$600,000 of gain on gifts would be exempt; there would be no additional
exemption for any gain on later gifts or at death. It would be appropri-
234. An alternative would be simply to allow no minimum basis increase for lifetime gifts.
This could be justified on the grounds that the voluntary nature of gifts makes special exemptions
unnecessary. But the resulting discontinuity between the gains tax and the transfer taxes would be
unfortunate, and also unnecessary, given the solution described in the text.
235. Indebtedness is deductible under Section 2053.
236. A liability in excess of basis could result from the decedent's having borrowed against
the appreciation in the property (and having consumed the borrowed funds before his death). It
also could result from accelerated depreciation deductions. The availability of the small estate
exemption against depreciation recapture is discussed in text following note 295.
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ate to reduce, however, any net loss at death by the amount of gain
exempted during life.237
The effects of a gains exemption are the same as the effects of min-
imum basis, with respect to marital bequests and liabilities of the
estate.
c. Value Exemption
Since the transfer taxes and the transfer tax exemption (provided
by the unified credit) are based on the value of transferred assets, a
value-based gains tax exemption would provide the closest coordination
between the transfer tax and gains tax exemptions. There are, however,
two serious objections to a value-based exemption.
First, a value exemption requires, in the case of an estate larger
than the exemption amount, some mechanism for determining which
assets pass under the exemption and which assets are subject to gains
tax. This could be done by a mechanical rule (including the possibility
of a rule requiring basis reallocation, thus making identification of par-
ticular assets unnecessary) or by giving the executor the power to iden-
tify exempt assets. But either a mechanical rule or an election would
involve considerable complexity. More serious is the problem already
noted in the discussion of minimum basis-that an exemption based on
the amount of the taxable estate imposes no limit on the amount of
gain that may exist in an exempt estate. The estate tax deduction for
liabilities creates the possibility that a taxable estate of less than
$600,000 may contain appreciation of much more than $600,000. Al-
lowing such an unlimited gains exemption is unacceptable. The exemp-
tion could be limited by providing that gain must be recognized to the
extent it exceeds the exemption amount, but that is nothing more than
a convoluted way of using a gain exemption rather than a value
exemption.
2. Issues in Implementing a Minimum Basis Rule
The remainder of this discussion assumes that the small estate ex-
emption will take the form of a minimum basis allowance and considers
some issues involved in designing a minimum basis exemption. Many of
the comments are equally applicable, however, to a gain exemption.
237. This is required by Canadian law. Income Tax Act § 111(2) (1992).
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a. Treatment of Estates Smaller Than the Minimum Basis
Amount
What should be done when an estate contains assets that would be
subject to the death gains tax but for the minimum basis rule,23 8 and
the total value of the assets is less than the minimum basis amount?
The simplest approach would be to take such estates entirely out of the
realization at death system and to provide that the current system-no
realization at death and fair market value basis under Section
1014-continues to apply to those estates. This has the major advan-
tage of making proof of basis entirely irrelevant for small estates.3 9
This approach, however, does result in an unfortunate cliff effect
with respect to losses. Imagine an estate with just one asset, with a
value of $600,000 and a basis of $1,000,000. Under the proposal, the
estate is just small enough that it remains subject to current law, with
the result that the $400,000 loss is not realized. By contrast, if the value
of the asset were $600,001, the loss ($399,999) would be realized at
death. This cliff effect not only seems unfair, it also creates the poten-
tial for some rather bizarre valuation controversies. The alternative is
to permit estates with net losses to realize those losses, no matter how
small the estates. But this means that proof of basis may be required
for any estate, no matter how small.240 Although the cliff effect on the
denial of losses is certainly disturbing, on balance it is an acceptable
price to pay for simplification, especially given the fact that taxpayers
generally can plan for lifetime dispositions to avoid the cliff effect.241
b. Allocation of the Minimum Basis Adjustment
Critics of the carryover basis law complained that considerable
complexity was created by the need to allocate the allowable minimum
238. This excludes assets exempt under the special rules for nonbusiness tangible personal
property, income in respect of a decedent (if current Section 691 is retained, as discussed in text
accompanying notes 284-93), and marital and charitable bequests. It includes, however, lifetime
taxable gifts.
239. This was the approach of the leading carryover basis clean-up proposal. H.R. 4694 § 2(a)
(proposed § 1023(a)(3)).
240. It also would create the potential for the minimum basis adjustment inappropriately
creating or increasing a net loss (rather than reducing or eliminating a net gain). Suppose an estate
consists of Asset A, with a basis of zero and a value of $300,000, and Asset B, with a basis of
$400,000 and a value of $100,000. The estate has no actual net gain or loss, but a $200,000 mini-
mum basis adjustment to Asset A would create an artificial net loss of $200,000. It should be easy
enough, however, to draft a rule providing that the minimum basis adjustment cannot be used to
create or enlarge a net loss.
241. In any event, the denial of losses at death is a feature of the law taxpayers have dealt
with for many years.
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basis increase among the various assets of the estate. 2  Since different
assets would go to different beneficiaries and would be disposed of at
different times, how the basis was allocated had significant tax conse-
quences. In this respect, taxation of gains at death is simpler than car-
ryover basis. Since all the capital gains and losses realized at death will
be netted against each other, it makes no difference how the minimum
basis adjustment is allocated among the estate's capital assets. The allo-
cation of the adjustment could matter only if there was a question of
whether it should be allocated to capital gain assets or ordinary income
assets.2 43 As discussed below,2 44 the adjustment might be made available
only to capital assets. But even if it is available for ordinary income
.assets, the allocation rule would be simple: the allowable adjustment is
allocated to capital assets to the maximum extent possible (i.e., up to
their estate tax values), and any remaining allowable adjustment is allo-
cated to ordinary income assets (how it is allocated among those assets
makes no difference).
c. Ordinary Income Items
It is questionable whether ordinary income should be eligible for
the minimum basis adjustment.245 Three different forms of ordinary in-
come merit separate consideration: income in respect of a decedent
(IRD), gain on Section 1221(1) inventory-type assets, and depreciation
recapture.2 46 Issues relating to IRD-the most important of which is
whether IRD items should be taxed at death or when they are col-
lected-are discussed elsewhere in this Article. 47 That discussion con-
cludes that the minimum basis allowance should not apply to IRD,
regardless of how the timing issue is resolved. Inventory items raise the
same timing issue, and therefore are discussed in connection with IRD.
Again, the conclusion is that minimum basis should not apply. 4 8 The
better policy on recapture income is not to allow the minimum basis
adjustment: the price of taking an artificial depreciation deduction
against ordinary income should be the recapture of the deduction no
later than at death. Moreover, the fact that depreciation deductions
242. Background and Issues at 27 (cited in note 30).
243. All capital assets held at death would be deemed to give rise to long-term gain or loss,
regardless of the actual holding period. See Tax Reform Studies and Proposals at 340 (cited in
note 148).
244. See text accompanying notes 245-49.
245. Section 1023 did not disqualify ordinary income property (other than income in respect
of a decedent) from its minimum basis adjustment. I.R.C. § 1023(d). By contrast, the Canadian
$100,000 gain exemption applies only to capital gains. Income Tax Act § 110.6 (1992).
246. I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250.
247. See text accompanying notes 284-93.
248. See text accompanying notes 294-95.
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have been claimed on the property eliminates any argument that the
estate cannot be expected to know the basis of the property.
Not allowing the minimum basis adjustment against ordinary in-
come items does create limited potential for imposing gains tax at death
(or after death, depending on how the timing issues are resolved) in
cases in which the estate tax would not apply, but the reasons for tax-
ing such income justify the discontinuity. Incidentally, the discontinu-
ity exists under current law in the case of IRD.24 e
d. The Post-Transfer Basis of Exempt Assets
When appreciated property transfers free of gains tax under the
minimum basis exemption, the question arises whether the property
should take a carryover basis or a fair market value basis in the hands
of the transferee. I think the best answer is a bifurcated approach: ex-
empt gifted property should receive a carryover basis and exempt estate
property should receive a fair market value basis-in other words, pre-
sent law (Sections 1015 and 1014) should continue with respect to ex-
empted transfers. This approach can be criticized for its seeming logical
inconsistency, and for perpetuating a limited lock-in effect. The alter-
native to carryover basis for exempted gifts is offering taxpayers
$600,000 of tax-free basis increase on voluntary lifetime gifts. That is,
of course, much more generous than current law, and there does not
seem to be any good reason for such generosity. Stepped-up basis at
death, by contrast, serves an important simplification purpose by avoid-
ing proof of basis problems for small estates-which the history of car-
ryover basis suggests is a political necessity. In addition, stepped-up
basis at death is not available for voluntary transfers, and it is not more
generous than current law.
A closely related question is whether property passing under the
marital exemption, which ordinarily would receive a pure carryover ba-
sis, should be entitled to any otherwise unused minimum basis.2 50 Sup-
pose, for example, that the estate has two assets, each with a zero basis.
Asset A, valued at $400,000, goes to the decedent's child, who takes it
with a $400,000 basis under the minimum basis rule. Asset B, valued at
,$300,000, goes to the decedent's spouse. Should the spouse take it with
a zero carryover basis, or a $200,000 basis (representing the portion of
the minimum basis not applied to the other property)? The argument
for allocating "left over" minimum basis to a marital bequest is that
249. IRD items always are subject to income tax, I.R.C. § 691, even if the estate is too small
to be subject to estate tax.
250. Essentially the same issue is considered, in a different context (a proposal generally not
to apply Section 1014 to marital bequests), in Gutman, 69 Va. L. Rev. at 1237 (cited in note 160).
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such an allocation is necessary to avoid discrimination against marital
bequests. If such an allocation is not permitted, the nonmarital be-
quests of a small estate get a tax-free basis step-up, but the marital
bequest gets only a carryover basis.
Although there is some merit to that argument, I favor not permit-
ting the allocation. Only the zero basis (in the example) is consistent
with the fundamental premise of the marital exemption-that transfers
between spouses should be treated as. nullities for tax purposes. More-
over, pure carryover basis (with no adjustments ivhatsoever) is very
simple 51 and avoids the difficulties of allocating the minimum basis al-
lowance among the various assets received by the surviving spouse. 52
e. Coordination With the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion
Complete coordination of the gains tax exemption with the gift tax
would require ignoring any appreciation in property transferred under
the $10,000 gift tax annual exclusion of Section 2503(b), just as the gift
tax ignores the transfer. This could be done, of course; but given suffi-
cient donees, sufficient years to work with, and highly appreciated prop-
erty, it would constitute a major loophole in the gains tax. Perhaps the
loophole should be acceptable, because basis will carryover and gain will
merely be deferred. Still, the loophole has the potential to defer tax for
a generation (or for two generations, if the gift is to a grandchild), and
such deferral normally is not permitted under a gains tax on gifts and
bequests. A possible solution would be to apply the annual exclusion to
both taxes, but to narrow significantly the scope of the exclusion-for
example, by limiting it to gifts of cash and tangible personal property.
f. Coordination With the Nonbusiness Tangible Personal
Property (TPP) Rules
As discussed later in the Article, there should be a special rule giv-
ing each item of nonbusiness tangible personal property a minimum ba-
sis (perhaps $5,000) for computing gain at death. 53 The general
minimum basis adjustment and an item-by-item TPP $5,000 minimum
basis allowance (for purposes of computing gain) should be coordinated
in the following way. A TPP item valued at $5,000 or less should be
ignored entirely-treated as if it did not exist-in determining the gen-
251. Even with pure carryover basis, there will never be a need to establish the basis of the
assets, if the surviving spouse holds them until death, and the surviving spouse's estate does not
exceed the minimum basis amount.
252. As explained in text accompanying notes 242-44, minimum basis in a carryover system
requires allocation, whereas minimum basis in a recognition system generally does not.
253. See text accompanying notes 253-68.
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eral minimum basis adjustment. A TPP item valued at more than
$5,000 should be treated like any other asset for purposes of computing
the general minimum basis adjustment (regardless of whether the
item's basis is the $5,000 minimum basis or some higher actual basis).
Ignoring low value TPP items in computing the general minimum basis
adjustment creates some potential for entirely exempting an estate
from the gains tax, even though the estate is large enough to be subject
to the estate tax. The potential is limited, however, and should be toler-
ated in the interests of simplicity.
E. Issues Associated With Particular Types of Assets
1. The Treatment of Nonbusiness Tangible Personal Property
Nonbusiness tangible personal property (TPP) presents special ad-
ministrative problems for a capital gains tax at death. Such assets tend
to be numerous and of relatively low value. Moreover, these are the as-
sets for which adequate basis records most likely do not exist. Taxpay-
ers may fail to keep basis records for TPP because the costs are often
trivial, because they do not expect the assets to appreciate,5 4 because
they know a loss would be nondeductible, 255 and simply because the
nonbusiness context of the acquisition makes business-type records
seem unnecessary.
One could argue that whatever allowances must be made for tax-
payers who fail to keep basis records for TPP in reliance on Section
1014, taxpayers must keep records or bear the consequences for assets
acquired after the effective date of a death gains tax. But that argu-
ment expects too much of people; special rules for TPP are clearly
needed.
At the other extreme from no special rules, a capital gains death
tax simply could exempt all TPP from the tax, and continue to give
those assets a basis equal to fair market value at death. Even total ex-
emption would not have a major revenue impact. Professor Shakow has
estimated that TPP (referred to by him as "consumer durables") con-
stitute only 8.6% of the total value of all assets owned by individuals. 256
The vast majority of these assets fall into categories involving no signif-
254. Consumer durables, such as cars, furniture, and appliances, almost always decline in
value over time, unless they fall into the special category of collectibles (such as antique cars).
255. Individuals may deduct losses only if they are incurred in a trade or business, in a trans-
action entered into for profit, or as a result of casualty or theft. I.R.C. § 165(c). A loss on the sale
of a personal use item falls into none of those categories.
256. David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1111, 1125 (1986). Shakow's figure is based on data compiled by the Federal Reserve
Board as of the end of 1984.
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icant chance of appreciation. Shakow estimates that potentially appre-
ciable TPP ("collectibles", such as art, antiques, and jewelry) constitute
at most one percent of the value of all assets held by individuals, and
probably closer to half that.2 57 Despite the relative insignificance of
TPP in the overall picture, two concerns counsel against total exemp-
tion. One is equity: a small number of taxpayers will have very large
gains in art and antiques, and it is unfair to exempt those gains when
other taxpayers are taxed on much more modest gains. The other is tax
avoidance: although collectibles are not now of great significance, their
significance will increase if wealthy taxpayers are led to invest in them
as the only means of avoiding the death gains tax for large amounts of
gain.
258
A limited exemption is needed. There are two issues concerning the
exemption: whether it should apply on an asset-by-asset basis (versus
an aggregate basis), and what should be the dollar amount of the ex-
emption. Section 1023 used an aggregate exemption: $10,000 (by estate
tax value) of "personal and household effects" were exempted from car-
ryover basis and given a fair market value basis under Section 1014.259
Proposed clean-up legislation would have increased the exemption
amount and would have extended the exemption to all nonbusiness tan-
gible personal property.260 Canada, by contrast, provides a $1,000 mini-
mum basis for each item of "personal use property" for purposes of
computing gain on its disposition (whether by sale, gift, or bequest)."'
A special rule treats "properties ordinarily disposed of as a set" as a
single item of personal use property for purposes of the minimum basis
allowance.262
257. Id. at 351.
258. For the same reason, Shakow argues against totally exempting consumer durables from
the accrual taxation system he proposes: "If policymakers removed these assets from the system,
taxpayers would be encouraged to invest in them because of their tax-favored status. The potential
for tax shelters and tax planning revolving around exempted consumer durables is too strong to
ignore." Id. at 1152.
259. I.R.C. § 1023(b)(3).
260. H.R. 4694 § 2(a) (proposed § 1023(b)(3), providing for a $25,000 exclusion).
261. Income Tax Act § 46(1) (1992). An interesting refinement of the Canadian law is its
identification of "listed personal property" as a subset of personal use property. Listed personal
property refers to certain classes of personal use property with significant investment poten-
tial-art, jewelry, rare books, stamps, and coins. Id. § 54(e). The significance of the distinction is
that losses on personal use property are totally nondeductible, whereas losses on listed personal
property are deductible against gains on other listed personal property. Id. § 41. This limited de-
ductibility of losses on TPP with significant investment elements makes good sense. The list is,
however, somewhat underinclusive (antique cars and furniture, for example, are not included).
262. Id. § 46(3). Technically, Section 46(3) of the Canadian Act applies only to a disposition
that breaks up a set, but the clear implication is that a set disposed of as a set also is entitled to
only $1,000 of minimum basis. Graetz reports that the British capital gains tax at death, in force
between 1965 and 1973, also used an item-by-item exemption and treated a set of articles as a
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In choosing between the asset-by-asset and aggregate approaches,
it is important to keep in mind the goal of simplifying the administra-
tion of the system with respect to assets of small value. An asset-by-
asset exemption is truly simple: in the vast majority of cases involving
TPP, it will be clear immediately that the asset is worth less than the
exemption amount, and nothing more will need to be done. By contrast,
under an aggregate exemption, the executor must value every asset and
must choose which assets to apply the exemption against. Moreover, if
the value of any exempted asset is raised or lowered on an estate tax
audit, an adjustment will be required in the identification of exempted
assets.263
Concern with ease of administration suggests a TPP exemption
should apply to gratuitous transfers during life, as well as at death.264
Of the two exemption methods, asset-by-asset is simpler to apply to
lifetime gifts. Under the asset-by-asset method, whether the exemption
applies to a particular gift depends only on the value of that gift. But
under the aggregate method, the exemption must be applied cumula-
tively, which means that whether the exemption applies to a particular
gift depends on the total value of exempt gifts made in all prior years.
(This cumulation also, of course, would affect the amount of exemption
remaining to be used at death.) The need for record keeping, and the
possibility of disputes over the value of prior years' gifts, are at odds
with the goal of simplification. The aggregate method also leads to re-
sults that are questionable in terms of substance: until the exemption
amount is exhausted, very substantial gains on lifetime transfers can
escape tax; and after the exemption is exhausted, even trivial gains
(whether on gifts or bequests) are at least theoretically taxable. But the
asset-by-asset method means that substantial gains always are taxable
and trivial gains always are exempt.
265
single item. Graetz, 59 Va. L. Rev. at 843 (cited in note 84). Although there were some cases of
disagreement over whether related articles constituted a set, practitioners "experienced very few
doubtful cases and did not consider this problem to be particularly important." Id. at 843 n.37.
Revenue Canada officials also stated that the set rule has not created any serious problems. Inter-
views by author (cited in note 88).
263. If the value of an asset is lowered, the executor should be allowed to exempt other assets
in order to fully utilize the exemption amount. If the value of an asset is raised, the executor
should be allowed to choose which assets to remove from the list of exempt assets.
264. However, in order not to create a tax avoidance incentive to make lifetime transfers of
appreciated TPP, an exempted lifetime gift should result in a carryover basis, rather than the fair
market value basis given to exempted transfers at death. In other words, the distinction of present
law between Sections 1014 and 1015 of the U.S. Code should continue to apply to exempted gratui-
tous transfers of TPP.
265. An asset-by-asset exemption could go one step further, as Canada has done, and make
the exemption available even for sales and other dispositions taxable under current law. Income
Tax Act § 46(1) (1992). To a significant extent, the legitimate concerns about basis record-keeping
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On the other hand, if controlling the total amount of gain ex-
empted (whether during life or at death) is a major concern, only the
aggregate method provides that control. The concern here is that the
asset-by-asset method could be abused by a taxpayer who acquires a
great many assets of small value taken individually, but of considerable
value in the aggregate, 266 and who thereby exempts an inappropriately
large amount of gain. I tend to discount this concern, because the
method is both too cumbersome and too uncertain (there is no guaran-
tee the assets will appreciate after their acquisition) to appeal to many
taxpayers.
Although on balance I prefer the asset-by-asset method, either
method is workable,267 and the choice between them is not one of the
more important issues in implementing a gains tax at death. There is,
of course, no right answer as to what the amounts of the exemptions
should be, but $5000 should strike about the right balance as an asset-
by-asset exemption,268 and perhaps $100,000 as an aggregate exemption.
2. Issues Relating to Personal Residences
Should a special exemption from a death gains tax be provided for
appreciation in the decedent's personal residence? The 1969 Treasury
proposal argued it should not, on the premise that a marital exemption
and a minimum basis allowance made it unnecessary.269 I agree with the
Treasury position: if the residence does not go to the surviving spouse,
and if the gain would not be exempt under the generally applicable
minimum basis rule (or other small estate exemption), there is no good
reason to allow a special exemption.
This having been said, several subsidiary points are worth noting.
First, proposals occasionally have been made for a general exemption
apply even to such dispositions. Moreover, this is an area in which enforcement is almost impossi-
ble and compliance is presumably very low. Officially providing an exemption in such cases would
bring the law in line with practice. By contrast, allowing an aggregate exemption to apply to cur-
rently taxable dispositions would make very little sense. It would exempt substantial gains (and,
once the exemption is exhausted, tax trivial gains), and it would complicate rather than simplify
the rules (by requiring taxpayers to report all gains and claim the exemption).
266. A stamp or coin collection would be a good example, assuming it is not treated as a
single asset under a "set" rule.
267. The aggregate method does have one advantage: unlike the asset-by-asset method, it
does not involve the problem of determining whether an asset is part of a set. However, this does
not appear to be a significant problem. See text accompanying note 262.
268. Revenue Canada officials told the author they thought the Canadian $1000 exemption
should be increased significantly. Interviews by author (cited in note 88).
269. Tax Reform Studies and Proposals at 342 (cited in note 148).
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from gains tax on any disposition of a personal residence."' Whatever
one's view of the merits of such an exemption, if it is adopted it cer-
tainly should apply at death as well as during life.2 7'
Second, if a capital gains tax is enacted without a general marital
exemption, there should be a special marital exemption for gain in a
personal residence left to a surviving spouse who continues to live in
the residence. A tax on the gain in the house in that situation is clearly
inappropriate, given its potential to evict the surviving spouse by forc-
ing a sale to pay the tax.
Third, there was concern in connection with the carryover basis
legislation that taxpayers understandably would fail to keep good
records of the basis of home improvements. To address this concern,
the leading clean-up proposal would have permitted, without proof, an
automatic basis increase for home improvements of $250 per year.272 A
gains tax at death could permit a similar adjustment-perhaps for a
larger amount, such as $1000, to reflect inflation since the 1970s. The
appropriateness of such an automatic adjustment, however, is debata-
ble. Taxpayers arguably should be expected to keep adequate cost
records for major improvements, and minor improvements generally
should be characterized as repairs not giving rise to basis. If an auto-
matic adjustment is permitted, a question arises as to whether it should
be permitted only in connection with gains realized at death, or also in
connection with taxable dispositions during life. The carryover basis ad-
justment would have applied only at death, but the argument in favor
of the adjustment seems to have equal force regardless of when the tax-
able event occurs.
Finally, there is an issue of how (if at all) to coordinate a gains tax
at death with the one-time exclusion of $125,000 of gain on the sale of a
personal residence by a taxpayer at least 55 years old. Section 1023 pro-
vided no coordination; if the exemption was not used during life, it was
lost. In the clean-up discussions, some argued the estate should be able
to sell and take advantage of Section 121 if the decedent could have
270. See, for example, Lee Sheppard, Should Sales of Personal Residences be Exempt from
Tax?, 50 Tax Notes 1433 (1991). Canada has such a general exemption, which applies to disposi-
tions both during life and at death. Income Tax Act § 40(6) (1992).
271. Note, however, that elimination of the tax-free step up in basis at death would weaken
the argument for having a general exemption in the first place. A major argument for a general
exemption is that the combination of the tax-deferred rollover provision, I.R.C. § 1034, the one-
time $125,000 exclusion, and the forgiveness of tax at death, results in personal residence gain
being taxed to relatively few taxpayers. The argument concludes that those few hapless taxpayers
should not be taxed when all others are not. That argument would be weakened seriously by the
introduction of a tax on gains at death. On the other hand, Canada has chosen to exempt personal
residence gain despite the taxation of gains at death.
272. H.R. 4694 § 2(a) (proposed § 1023(e)(2)). The adjustment would have been permitted
only at the time of the homeowner's death.
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done so immediately before death.2 73 The Treasury supported only a
more limited coordination to permit a surviving spouse to take advan-
tage of the exclusion on a subsequent sale if the decedent had been
older than fifty-five and the surviving spouse was not.17" A gains tax at
death with a marital exemption (resulting in carryover basis) could pro-
vide the same limited coordination. 5
In the context of a gains tax at death and a personal residence not
left to a surviving spouse, the major options concerning the $125,000
exclusion would be: not allowing the exclusion at all; allowing the exclu-
sion any time the decedent would have been eligible for the exclusion
immediately before death; and allowing the exclusion in any case in
which the decedent had not used it while alive, even if the decedent was
younger than fifty-five. The choice depends on one's view of the pur-
pose of the exclusion. It could be viewed as personal to the taxpayer: as
designed to enable a taxpayer to use residence appreciation to finance
his retirement, undiminished by a capital gains tax.276 So viewed, the
justification for the exclusion dies with the taxpayer, and no exclusion
should be allowed against the death gains tax.2 " Alternatively, the ex-
clusion might be viewed as an extremely rough inflation adjustment, or
as a reflection of a policy that only unusually large gains-major wind-
falls-in personal residences should be taxed. If so, the exclusion should
be available to the estate as long as the decedent had not used it al-
ready, regardless of the decedent's age at death. Under neither view
would the middle approach-allowing the exclusion only if the decedent
were over fifty-five-make particularly good sense, but it nevertheless
might have appeal as a compromise solution. And it does have the argu-
able virtue, unlike the other two choices, of treating death neu-
trally-i.e., neither eliminating nor creating a tax benefit by reason of
the taxpayer's death.
273. This would require that the decedent have been at least 55 years old and not previously
have taken advantage of the exclusion.
274. Carryover Basis at 192 (cited in note 106) (letter of Donald C. Lubick to Senator Dole).
275. It could be objected that Congress thought special relief was justified only for relatively
elderly persons moving their wealth out of housing, so that the relatively young widow should not
inherit her older spouse's exemption. But allowing her the exemption might have major public
relations value for the tax laws, while resulting in only very modest revenue loss.
276. This view is supported by the legislative history of the exclusion, which notes that an
elderly person selling his home may "require some or all of the funds obtained from the sale of the
old residence to meet his and his wife's living expenses," and which concludes that imposing a tax
in such a case "is an undesirable burden on our elderly taxpayers." H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963), reprinted at 1964-1 (Part 2) C.B. 125, 169.
277. The Congressional Budget Office assumed a death gains tax under which "the existing
$125,000 exclusion on the gain from sale of a principal residence could be claimed if it had not
already been used." Reducing the Deficit at 315 (cited in note 14). It is not clear whether this




Under current law, Section 101 generally excludes from gross in-
come life insurance proceeds payable by reason of the death of the in-
sured. This can be viewed as a special instance of the forgiveness at
death of tax on appreciation. Thus, if a tax is to be imposed on gains at
death, the exclusion for life insurance proceeds should be reconsidered.
The carryover basis legislation explicitly indicated that it did not
affect the life insurance exclusion. 78 However, the conversion of life in-
surance to cash at death meant that the carryover basis compromise
was not available for life insurance. Congress was faced with the choice
of either taxing it at death or not taxing it at all, and it was unwilling to
tax at death.
In a system in which taxation of gains at death is the general rule,
should life insurance proceeds be subject to that general rule? Logic
and consistency suggest they should. On the other hand, a major con-
cern with a gains tax at death is liquidity,279 and life insurance is an
important means of providing liquidity at death. Not taxing insurance
proceeds would encourage the use of insurance to fund death tax liabili-
ties. 280 If an exemption is retained for this reason, it should be limited
in accordance with its rationale. Rules should be designed to limit the
exclusion to the excess of death tax liabilities over other liquid assets in
the estate.
As an alternative to either completely removing the exemption, or
removing it subject to special liquidity-related relief, Congress could
distinguish between the investment gain (inside build-up) in life insur-
ance and the mortality gain (or loss), taxing the former but not the
latter.281 The investment gain could be taxed either annually on an ac-
crual basis, 282 or only at death. Taxation of inside build-up is justified
by its similarity to taxable interest income. Ignoring mortality gains
and losses could be explained on the grounds that the beneficiaries of
one who dies early (and thus has a mortality gain) are likely to suffer
serious financial hardship from the death, and so deserve a tax
subsidy.
283
278. Section 1023(b)(2)(B) provided that "property described in section 2042 (relating to
proceeds of life insurance)" was not carryover basis property.
279. See text accompanying notes 304-30.
280. See Graetz, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes at 1295 (cited in note 38).
281. Graetz argues that, at the very least, a death gains tax should include taxation at death
of the investment gain in life insurance. Graetz, 59 Va. L. Rev. at 845 (cited in note 84).
282. This is a reform that has been seriously proposed independently of the taxation of gains
at death. A proposal to tax the inside build-up on life insurance annually on an accrual basis was
included in The President's Tax Proposals to Congress at 254-57 (cited in note 15).
283. Moreover, if both mortality gains and losses are ignored for tax purposes, in the aggre-
gate the gains and losses cancel out, and the revenue effect should be close to neutral. This would
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4. Income in Respect of a Decedent and Other Ordinary
Income Items
Income in respect of a decedent (IRD)284 is, in general, income that
has accrued before death, but that was not taxable before death under
the tax accounting rules applicable to the decedent. Important exam-
ples include compensation for services rendered, accrued dividends and
interest, amounts in qualified retirement plans, and amounts due on
installment sales. IRD items are usually, but not always, ordinary in-
come.28 5 Under current law, the benefit of Section 1014 does not apply
to IRD.286 Instead, the item is taxable to the estate or beneficiary at the
same time and in the same manner that it would have been taxed if the
decedent had lived. 81 Generally, this means the item will be taxed to
the estate or beneficiary when payment is received. Thus, under current
law, tax on IRD is not forgiven at a taxpayer's death.
In the context of a proposal generally to tax gains at death, the
issue with respect to IRD is whether to continue current law (a carry-
over basis approach) or to tax IRD at death.2 88 The 1969 Treasury pro-
posal to tax gains at death would have repealed the special rules for
IRD and required recognition of IRD at death.289 The stated rationale
was that the IRD rules "were designed to avoid bunching of ordinary
income in the decedent's final return," and that bunching could be
dealt with instead by the use of averaging rules.29 0
Treasury was correct in stating that avoiding bunching was the his-
torical explanation for the carryover basis treatment of IRD.29' If it is
also the only reason to continue current treatment, then it is not a good
enough reason. Under the current nearly flat income tax rate structure,
bunching is not an important issue; if rates should change to make it an
important issue, it can be addressed with averaging provisions.
But bunching is not the only possible reason for not taxing IRD at
death. There is also the problem of valuing IRD items, which is neces-
sary if tax is imposed at death, but not if tax is deferred until payment
not be the case, however, if mortality losses were permitted to offset investment gains. In that case,
some mortality losses would produce a tax benefit, but no mortality gains would produce a tax
detriment.
284. I.R.C. § 691.
285. For example, capital gain deferred under Section § 453 (relating to installment sales)
would be income in respect of a decedent. I.R.C. § 691(a)(4).
286. I.R.C. § 1014(c).
287. Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-3.
288. The issue does not arise under a general carryover basis at death system, such as Sec-
tion 1023, because carryover basis applies the current treatment of IRD to all assets held at death.
289. Tax Reform Studies and Proposal at 338-39 (cited in note 148).
290. Id.
291. H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 84-85 (1942).
[Vol. 46:361
TAXING GAINS
is received. David Westfall has stated that classic IRD items (such as
accrued salary, interest, and dividends) are not hard to value, and must
be valued anyway for the estate tax.292 But neither of his claims is en-
tirely accurate. Most classic IRD items may not be unusually difficult to
value, but valuation is not as simple as determining the amount ulti-
mately due. Those amounts would have to be discounted to reflect the
expected delay in the receipt of cash and doubts as to the payors'
creditworthiness. Moreover, under current law, items of IRD are taxa-
ble upon receipt of payment, even when the estate is not subject to
estate tax, and one would not expect Congress to change this rule upon
adoption of a gains death tax. Assuming there continues to be no small
estate exemption from the taxability of IRD, taxing IRD at death
would require valuation in many cases in which the estate tax does not
require valuation. In short, the treatment of IRD under current law is
better than a tax at death for avoiding valuation problems and for
avoiding the need for a later tax adjustment if the amount ultimately
received does not equal the amount included in income at death.
In addition, since IRD items generally are received within a reson-
ably short time after death, any deferral obtained from retention of cur-
rent law would be minor and would be a reasonable price to pay in
order to obtain the advantages of matching the imposition of the tax
with the receipt of cash-i.e., avoiding the need for valuation and
avoiding liquidity problems.
On balance, it seems that the present treatment of ordinary income
items of IRD works reasonably well, is neither too harsh nor too gener-
ous, and should be retained even under a system that generally taxes
gains at death. Thus, such items should continue to be given carryover
basis treatment, and should not be eligible for any small estate exemp-
tion to the death gains tax. On the other hand, capital gains IRD
items-such as deferred gain on installment sales-have more in com-
mon with other capital gains than with other IRD. The similarities are
both in terms of the typical length of the delay between death and the
receipt of payment, and in terms of the nature of the income. Like
other capital gains, capital gain IRD items should be subject to the
death gains tax, but should be eligible for the small estate exemption.
Closely related to the question of the treatment of IRD under a
death gains tax is the question of how other items of ordinary income
should be treated. The two most important categories are appreciation
in inventory and other Section 1221(1) assets, and depreciation recap-
ture. The issues are whether any small estate exemption should be
292. General Tax Reform: Panel Discussions Before the Committee on Ways and Means, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1528 (1973) (statement of David Westfall).
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available against gain on such assets, and whether that gain should be
recognized at death or subject to carryover basis.2 93
With respect to inventory, basis records generally are good and tax-
payers expect to pay tax on gains from sales in the ordinary course of
business, so there is neither an administrative nor an equitable argu-
ment for allowing such gain to escape tax through a small estate exemp-
tion. As for timing, the same arguments that favor carryover basis for
IRD items also favor carryover basis here.294 Carryover basis avoids val-
uation and liquidity problems, and the resulting deferral is limited be-
cause the inventory normally will be sold not long after death.9 5
With respect to depreciation recapture, there is no serious issue of
timing. The rule clearly should impose a tax at death, rather than car-
ryover basis. The asset with the recapture potential must be valued at
death anyway for purposes of the capital gains tax, and carryover basis
could result in deferral of unlimited duration. The closer question is
whether the small estate exemption should apply against recapture in-
come. This is basically a question of how generous Congress decides to
be, but certainly Congress could conclude that it is one thing to forgive
tax on a limited amount of unrealized -appreciation, and quite another
never to require taxpayers to account for artificial deductions taken
against ordinary income. If Congress generously allowed the small es-
tate exemption to apply against recapture, it could impose an ordering
rule requiring the exemption to be used first against capital gain, to the
extent thereof.
F. Treatment of Losses on Gifts and Bequests
Under current law, a taxpayer may deduct capital losses only
against capital gains and a very limited amount of other income ($3,000
per year).296 Capital losses disallowed under this rule may be carried
forward indefinitely.
297
The standard rationale for this limitation is to prevent taxpayers
With large portfolios of capital assets from selectively realizing losses to
shelter ordinary income, while not realizing gains. The rule functions as
a conclusive presumption that capital losses in excess of capital gains
293. The Canadian $100,000 exemption is for capital gains only, Income Tax Act § 110.6
(1992); but the Section 1023(d) minimum basis allowance was not limited to capital assets (al-
though it did not apply to IRD items).
294. The 1969 Treasury proposal, however, would have taxed inventory at death at its whole-
sale value. Tax Reform Studies and Proposals at 348 (cited in note 148).
295. Carryover basis, however, would require the complication of a deduction or basis in-
crease on account of the estate tax attributable to the appreciation in the inventory, modeled after
Section 691(c) (deduction for estate tax attributable to IRD item).
296. I.R.C. § 1211(b).
297. I.R.C. § 1212(b).
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(and $3000 of other income) are artificial-in the sense that they are
offset by unrealized capital gains-and therefore should be
nondeductible. 98
If the law mandates the realization at death of all capital gains and
losses, then obviously selective realization of losses is not an issue, and
the ordinary limits on the deductibility of capital losses should not ap-
ply. Moreover, even if the law permits a marital exemption, there is no
opportunity for selective realization of losses if the law requires reallo-
cation of basis, rather than the use of the actual basis of each asset.
Thus, in either a system without a marital exemption, or with a marital
exemption and basis reallocation, the only limit on the deductibility of
capital losses should be those indicated by statute of limitations con-
cerns. A sensible ordering rule for the use of capital losses realized at
death under such a system would be to deduct the losses against (a)
capital gains of the taxpayer's final year, including capital gains at
death, (b) $3000 of ordinary income of the final year, (c) capital gains of
the three preceding years, (d) remaining ordinary income of the final
year, and (e) ordinary income of the three preceding years.299
There is, however, some opportunity for selective realization of
losses at death under a system that allows a marital exemption and
does not require basis reallocation. If a net capital loss realized at death
is deductible against ordinary income without limitation, the executor
might arrange to transfer the gain assets to the surviving spouse and
the loss assets to other beneficiaries, thus generating an artificial loss to
offset ordinary income. The opportunities to take advantage of this
plan are limited by the inability to determine the time of one's death in
order to maximize the opportunity to use capital losses.300 In addition,
nontax considerations concerning how much value and which assets to
pass to the surviving spouse and to other beneficiaries limit the advan-
tages of this plan. Given these practical limitations on tax planning op-
portunities, the generous rules outlined above for the treatment of
capital losses probably should apply even in a system with a marital
298. "Were capital losses deductible without limit, taxpayers would dispose of capital assets
selectively to produce a net loss with which to shelter noninvestment income." The President's
Tax Proposals to Congress at 172 (cited in note 15).
299. This is similar to the 1969 Treasury proposal, in the context of a system allowing a
marital exemption and using basis reallocation. Tax Reform Studies and Proposals at 336 (cited in
note 148). The proposed AET, which did not allow a marital exemption, nevertheless made no
provision for the deductibility of a net loss. Graetz rightly criticizes this rule as "too inequitable."
Graetz, 59 Va. L. Rev. at 851 (cited in note 84). To reflect the fact that capital gains are taxed at a
lower maximum rate than ordinary income (28% versus 31%; I.R.C. § 1(a),(h)), the law could
provide that capital losses offset ordinary income at a ratio lower than one to one-under current
rates, that $31 of capital losses would be required to offset $28 of ordinary income.
300. Strictly speaking, one may be able to ddtermine the time of one's own death, but only at
the cost of incurring a significant non-tax disadvantage.
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exemption and without basis reallocation. If Congress disagrees, how-
ever, a reasonable alternative would be: (a) to apply the generous de-
ductibility rules in any case in which there is no marital bequest,301 and
(b) to apply the normal rules limiting the deductibility of capital losses
by the decedent in other cases, but to permit the unused losses realized
by the decedent at death to carryover to the surviving spouse. The jus-
tification for such carryover is simple: if the decedent is denied the
losses on the presumption that they are offset by gains transferred to
the surviving spouse, then appropriate matching of gains and losses re-
quires carryover of the losses to the surviving spouse.
30 2
Unlike transfers at death, when the opportunity for selective reali-
zation of losses is either limited or nonexistent (depending on the de-
sign of the statute), gifts during life offer ample opportunity for
selective loss realization. It is clear that the normal capital loss limita-
tions should apply to losses realized on lifetime gifts. In addition, it is
arguable-as the Treasury proposed in 1969-that the Section 267 dis-
allowance of losses on sales between related persons also should apply
to gifts between related persons.3 03 An outright disallowance of such
losses would have the considerable advantage of eliminating the possi-
bility of manufacturing a loss by making a gift to a relative and claim-
ing an unrealistically low value for the property.
G. Providing Liquidity Relief
An important argument against taxation of capital gains at death is
that the imposition of the tax on illiquid estates consisting largely of
farms or small businesses could lead to forced sales to raise cash to pay
the tax, thereby hastening the demise of the family farm and the small
business person. The political significance of this argument is consider-
able: many close observers of the demise of carryover basis attributed
its repeal primarily to lobbying by farm and small business groups.304
301. Perhaps these deductibility rules also should apply to limited cases in which there is a
marital bequest, but it is clear that unrealized gains have not been selectively transferred to the
surviving spouse.
302. Canada, which has a marital exemption and no basis allocation, permits capital losses to
be deducted against ordinary income without limit in the year of the taxpayer's death or the pre-
ceding year. Income Tax Act § 111(2) (1992). This two-year restriction on the deductibility of
losses against ordinary income appears somewhat arbitrary.
303. Tax Reform Studies and Proposals at 339 (cited in note 148).
304. Hoffman, 37 Tax L. Rev. at 444 n.131 (cited in note 19). These groups argued against
carryover basis on the grounds of both difficulty of proving basis and liquidity concerns. Although
carryover basis did not result in a tax until- an asset was sold, the argument was that it neverthe-
less would create liquidity problems because appreciated assets would have to be sold to pay the
estate tax, and then the sale of those assets would generate an income tax, which would require
the sale of more appreciated assets to pay the income tax, and so on indefinitely. This was referred
to as the problem of "mushrooming" gains taxes. Background and Issues at 19 (cited in note 30).
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The liquidity problem is real, but it is also quite limited. The Trea-
sury Department estimated in 1979 that farms and closely-held busi-
nesses constituted only about seven percent of the value of all assets
owned at death,305 and more recent information suggests that figure has
not changed dramatically.306 Moreover, not every estate owning a farm
or small business has a liquidity problem. A study of Iowa farmers, for
example, found that liquid assets made up only 9.5% of the wealth of
living farmers, but twenty-five percent of the gross estates of deceased
farmers.30 7 The study speculated that this difference probably was at-
tributable to elderly farmers adjusting their holdings in anticipation
that liquidity would be needed to pay the estate tax.308 Elderly taxpay-
ers could respond in the same way to the prospect of a capital gains tax
at death. This is not to suggest that there never will be estates for
which a capital gains tax at death will present a liquidity crisis. There
will be such estates, but they will be the exception.
The problem of illiquid estates already exists, of course, under the
estate tax; the addition of a capital gains death tax increases the prob-
lem in degree but does not change it in kind. Assuming a fifty percent
top estate tax rate and a twenty-eight percent top capital gains tax rate,
and assuming that the capital gains death tax is deductible in comput-
ing the estate tax, the highest combined tax rate on appreciation at
death would be sixty-four percent. In terms of liquidity problems, such
a combination of taxes could be no worse than a sixty-four percent top
estate tax rate and no capital gains tax (and to the extent the estate's
value was not appreciation, it would not be as bad). By the standards of
recent history, sixty-four percent is not a particularly high death tax
rate. Before 1976 the highest estate tax rate was seventy-seven per-
cent,309 between 1976 and 1981 it was seventy percent, 110 in 1982 it was
305. Carryover Basis at 11 (cited in note 106) (statement of Donald C. Lubick).
306. The IRS has reported that 4.3% of the value of assets included in total gross estates on
1986 federal estate tax returns consisted of noncorporate business interests, and 27.6% consisted
of stock. Johnson, 9 SOI Bull. at 29 (cited in note 181). Unfortunately, the report does not indicate
what percentage of the stock was closely-held. A rather dated study (based on IRS data on 1965
estate tax returns) estimated that 15.9% of the value of all stock held by individuals was closely
held. Blume, Crockett and Friend, Stockownership in the United States: Characteristics and
Trends, 54 Surv. of Current Bus. 16 (1974), in Shakow, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1133 (cited in note
256). Applying that 15.9% figure to the 1986 data would result in closely-held stock constituting
4.4% of all assets held at death. Combined, closely-held stock and noncorporate business interests
would constitute 8.7% of all assets. (Johnson does not indicate whether noncorporate farm real
estate counted as real property or as noncorporate business interests. If it is counted as real prop-
erty, the total asset percentage allocable to farms and small businesses would be somewhat higher.)
307. Contemporary Studies Project: Large Farm Estate Planning and Probate in Iowa, 59
Iowa L. Rev. 794, 929 (1974).
308. Id. at 930.
309. Tax Reform Act of 1976 at 525 (cited in note 40).
310. Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 2001, 90 Stat. 1846-47.
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sixty-five percent, in 1983 it was sixty percent, from 1984 to 1992 it was
fifty-five percent, and in 1993 it is scheduled to fall to fifty percent.311
Thus, even in degree the liquidity problems that would arise from the
combined burden of the estate and gains taxes would not be a major
change from the recent past.
This means that the obvious starting point in thinking about li-
quidity relief for the gains tax should be the existing rules providing
liquidity relief for the estate tax. These are the deferral provisions of
Sections 6166 and 6161, and the special use valuation rules of Section
2032A. The crucial question is to what extent these provisions should
be expanded to deal with the additional liquidity burden that a death
gains tax would impose. 12
Under Section 6166, an estate may qualify to defer payment of es-
tate tax for five years, and then to pay the tax in as many as ten equal
annual installments. For an estate to qualify, it must have an interest in
a closely-held business that constitutes more than thirty-five percent of
the value of the adjusted gross estate.13 The amount of tax eligible for
the five-year deferral and the ten-year installment payments is an
amount bearing the same ratio to the total estate tax as the value of the
closely-held business bears to the adjusted gross estate. " This provi-
sion could be amended easily to allow deferral and installment payment
of death gains tax attributable to appreciation in a closely-held busi-
ness.3 16 This would require identifying the portion of the death gains
tax attributable to the closely-held business interest. Several identifica-
tion methods are possible, but the simplest (and most taxpayer-
favorable) would be at the margin: that is, to allow deferral of the
amount by which the death gains tax liability would have been de-
creased if the estate had not included the interest in the closely-held
business. Assuming that the thirty-five percent test is appropriate to
identify estates with liquidity problems in the estate tax context, the
same test also should apply for purposes of qualifying for deferral of
the death gains tax. 16
311. The rates for 1982 and later years are provided for by current Section 2001(c).
312. The current versions of all three liquidity relief provisions were in force in 1982, when
the highest estate tax rate was 65%, id. § 2001(c)(2)(B)-slightly higher than the 64% combined
burden of a 50% estate tax and a 28% gains tax. If Congress considered those provisions adequate
liquidity relief against a 65% estate tax, it also might well consider them adequate relief against a
64% combined tax burden.
313. Id. § 6166(a)(1).
314. Id. § 6166(a)(2).
315. The definition of an interest in a closely-held business in I.R.C. Section 6166(b)(1) could
apply for gains tax purposes as well as estate tax.
316. The death gains tax liability would reduce the adjusted gross estate (defined in I.R.C. §
6166(b)(6)), thus making it somewhat easier to satisfy the 35% test.
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Interest is payable annually on the tax deferred by Section 6166.' 17
The statute provides for a special four percent interest rate on the first
$345,800 of deferred estate tax liability. 18 Of course, Congress also
could apply the special rate to some limited portion of the deferred
gains tax liability.
Unlike the mechanical approach of Section 6166, Section 6161 gives
the government the discretion to extend the time for payment of the
estate tax. Upon a showing of reasonable cause, the extension may be
for as long as ten years.3 19 An example of reasonable cause would be
having to sell property at a sacrifice in order to pay the tax.32 0 This
provision also should apply to the death gains tax liability.
Section 2032A permits farmland (and real property used in a
closely-held business) to be valued for estate tax purposes according to
its value in its current use, rather than its "highest and best use" value,
under certain circumstances. The aggregate reduction in value under
this provision is limited to $750,000.321 In enacting this provision, Con-
gress was concerned that including the full development value of farm-
land in an estate could force the heirs to sell the land for development
in order to pay the tax, thereby threatening the future of family
farms.3 2 Although the congressional rationale certainly is subject to
criticism-on the grounds that it subsidizes relatively nonproductive
uses of land-whatever merit there is in special use valuation would
apply just as much to gains tax valuation as to estate tax valuation.
Thus, if Section 2032A continues to apply to the estate tax, it also
should apply to the death gains tax. Alternatively, the law simply could
provide for carryover basis rather than recognition at death, in cases in
which Section 2032A property passes to qualified heirs.32 3 This goes be-
yond legitimate liquidity concerns, but it might be necessary to mollify
the farm lobby.
324
If the estate tax liquidity provisions of current law are adequate,
then the minimal changes suggested above will be an adequate response
to the liquidity problems created by a death gains tax. Any number of
more radical changes are conceivable, of course, and Canada provides
317. Id. § 6166(f).
318. Id. § 6601(j).
319. Id. § 6161(a)(2).
320. Treas. Reg. § 20.6161-1(a)(2)(ii), Example (2) (interpreting stricter "undue hardship"
test of prior law).
321. I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(2).
322. Tax Reform Act of 1976 at 537 (cited in note 40).
323. Canada permits rollover of gain at death on the transfer of farm property to a child.
Income Tax Act §§ 70(9), 70(9.1), 70(9.2), 70(9.3) (1992).
324. Of course, it might not be enough to mollify the farm lobby. Certainly the lobby was not
satisfied with carryover basis in 1976.
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two possibilities. First, Canada allows payment of death gains tax in as
many as ten equal annual installments. 25 Interest is charged and secur-
ity must be furnished.326 The right to defer tax does not depend, how-
ever, on any showing of liquidity problems. This "no questions asked"
deferral provision has the advantage of simplicity, and if the interest
charged is appropriate and the security is adequate it does not lend
itself to abuse. Nevertheless, Congress has indicated its belief-through
Sections 6166 and 6161-that cases deserving liquidity relief can be
identified, and if Congress is correct in that belief, there is no good rea-
son to give such relief when it is not needed.
Canada also provides a special $500,000 gain exemption (as con-
trasted with the standard $100,000 gain exemption) for farms and
closely-held businesses.32 7 Because this exemption is available regard-
less of the nature of the disposition-even a cash sale is eligible-it
cannot be viewed plausibly as liquidity relief.328 But would a similar
exemption, available only for a deemed disposition at death, be appro-
priate as liquidity relief? It certainly would not be carefully targeted
relief. It would be overinclusive, in that a highly liquid estate could be
eligible for the exemption;32 9 and it would be underinclusive, in that it
would not solve the liquidity problems of estates with very valuable ap-
preciated farms and few liquid assets. 330 Better targeted liquidity relief
can and should be used instead.
VI. CONCLUSION
Considering the amount of attention that has been given to base-
broadening tax reform options since the mid-1980s, the virtual absence
of consideration of reforming the treatment of gains at death has been
appalling. The brief and unhappy life of carryover basis may explain
the status of Section 1014 reform as the dog that did not bark.3 But
325. Income Tax Act § 159(5) (1992).
326. Id. §§ 159(5), 159(7).
327. Id. §§ 110.6(2), 110.6(2.1).
328. Canadian practitioners, fearing the repeal of such a generous exemption, have developed
"crystallization" techniques designed to trigger recognition of gain on farms and closely-held busi-
nesses without actually disposing of the properties, in order to ensure that their clients do not lose
the exemption by repeal. (When exempt gain is recognized, basis is increased by the amount of the
exempt gain.) For a discussion by Revenue Canada of some crystallization techniques, see ATR-42
(1991). This problem would not exist, of course, if the exemption were available only for deemed
dispositions at death.
329. For example, an estate with a farm with a value of $500,000 and a basis of zero, and
$2,000,000 of unappreciated liquid assets, would qualify.
330. Consider, for example, an estate whose only significant asset is a farm valued at
$2,000,000, with a basis of zero.
331. "Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
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well over a decade has passed since the repeal of carryover basis, and it
is time for Congress to revisit the area. When it does so, it will find that
taxing gains at death is a more attractive option than carryover basis. It
also will find that, although there are difficult choices to be made
among simplicity, fairness, and revenue concerns, it is possible to design
a death gains tax that is workable, fair, and raises substantial revenue.
Consideration of such a tax should be high on Congress's tax agenda.
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
"That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes.
A. Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in William S. Baring-Gould, ed., The Annotated Sherlock Holmes
277 (C.N. Potter, 1967).
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